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As the costs of health-care administration and delivery continue to grow,
health-care fraud enforcement actions have increased in number and severity,
and, with the recently upheld Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
adding more than $350 million over the next ten years to fight health-care
fraud, they will likely continue to do so. Continuing a strategy it has used for
decades, the federal government is relying mainly on the False Claims Act
(FCA), an age-old statute with blunt penalties, to levy remarkable fines against
providers in an ever-expanding net of enforcement. But recent examples
indicate that the government is applying the FCA to scenarios in which its
application seems unwarranted. Namely, the government is now increasingly
wielding the FCA against "overtreatment -defined as cases in which a
provider has allegedly provided "too much" care in an inefficient, overly
expensive, or unnecessary way-presumably to address the looming fiscal
crisis. Exemphfied by the Department of Justice's ongoing implantable
cardioverter defibrillator investigation, the federal government is seeking to
regulate overtreatment through application of its powerful anti-fraud statute.
Even though health-care waste and abuse undeniably plague American health
care, this Article argues that the government's solution of applying the FCA
against providers who engage in overtreatment is doctrinally unsatisfying and
practically destructive. The overreliance on "data mining, " a desire to freeze
vague and developing practice standards, and the FCA's overwhelming
penalties that precipitate immediate settlement make up the key components of
this overtreatment enforcement model. This results in cascading settlements,
allowing the government to unilaterally change developing medical practice
standards with little clinical input or judicial review in what can be called
"backdoor rationing." Further, these anti-fraud initiatives often impact the
wrong providers and can stifle innovation.
This analysis provides an in-depth critique of this new development in health-
care fraud enforcement in an effort to decouple conventional health-care fraud
cases from overtreatment investigations. Ideally, this piece will start the
conversation toward an improved and more legitimate enforcement
framework. At bottom, it illustrates the doctrinal and practical problems that*
will likely continue to exist at the complex intersection of medical necessity,
health-care financing, and fraud-even as the administration of America's
health care undergoes radical change.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In America in 2013, being tough on health-care fraud is in vogue. CNBC
airs Health Care Hustle, a one-hour documentary that tracks white-collar
criminals in Puerto Rico and South Beach who defraud Medicare and Medicaid
by falsifying medical records, follows a crooked pharmacist in the middle of the
country, who-unbeknownst to his bosses-forges prescriptions and keeps the
profits, and visits officers of the U.S. government's special taskforce while its
members prepare for their next raid by practicing at a firing range.' President
Obama's Department of Justice (DOJ) publishes press releases praising its
successful pharmaceutical settlements2 and arrests of fraudsters3 as it protects
1See Scott Cohn, Health Care Hustle, CNBC INVESTIGATIONS, INC. (May 2, 2012),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/46824701/.
2 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to
Resolve Criminal & Civil Investigations of Off-Label Promotion of Depakote (May 7,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-civ-585.html (publicizing a
guilty plea by Abbott Laboratories Inc. for off-label marketing).
3 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Medicare Fraud
Strike Force Charges 107 Individuals for Approximately $452 Million in False Billing (May
2, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/05/20120502b.html
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taxpayers. Even citizens are now on the front lines of the war on health-care
fraud: CBS News' website tells Americans how to report, prevent, and learn
more about fraud affecting the federal health-care programs of Medicare and
Medicaid. 4
All of the attention is warranted, and the government's intense focus on
health-care fraud has made a difference in protecting American taxpayers.5
Indeed, it is clear that health-care fraud is an undeniable drain on the system and
accounts for a good percentage of overall health-care expenditures; in fact,
some estimate that health-care fraud is costing America as much as $100 billion
annually.6 By addressing fraud that is undoubtedly rampant, the government
seeks to offset ever-ballooning health-care costs. 7 This includes examples in
which an individual games the system by prescribing drugs or devices to a
fictional beneficiary, a pharmaceutical company knowingly violates the FDA
marketing laws in order to increase profits, or a career criminal opens a faux
medical device company to siphon money from Medicare or Medicaid. This
Article refers to these scenarios as "conventional" health-care fraud; other
authors have referred to similar examples as "traditional" fraud.8
But there is a larger problem affecting American health care. It is the
problem that I-and others including author Shannon Brownlee-refer to as
(documenting Medicare Fraud Strike Force investigations that resulted in charges against
107 people in a "nationwide takedown").
4 See Melissa McNamara, Preventing Health Care Fraud, CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2010,
9:33 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500823 162-2067346.html (offering tips on the
definition of health care fraud, reporting procedures, and suggestions for prevention).
5 The numbers of health care fraud cases opened under President Obama have
skyrocketed. See Bernice Yeung, S. Calif Lab, Radiology Company Accused ofHealth Care
Fraud, CAL. WATCH (June 18, 2012), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/s-calif-lab-
radiology-company-accused-health-care-fraud- 16517. In 2001, DOJ opened 211 FCA cases,
in 2008, the number rose to 291, and in 2011, it was 454. Id.
6 See Parija Kavilanz, Health Care: A 'Goldmine'for Fraudsters, CNNMONEY (Jan.
13, 2010, 3:07 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/01/13/news/economy/healthcarefraud/;
Merrill Matthews, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud Is Costing Taxpayers Billions, FORBES
(May 31, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2012/05/31/
medicare-and-medicaid-fraud-is-costing-taxpayers-billions/2/ (noting that "others, including
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, suggest that there is an estimated $60 to $90 billion in
fraud in Medicare and a similar amount for Medicaid"); Michael Winter, Feds Charge 107
with Defrauding Medicare of $452M, USA TODAY (May 2, 2012, 11:00 PM),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2012/05/feds-charge-107-with-
defrauding-medicare-of-450-million/1# (noting that "Medicare fraud costs taxpayers an
estimated $60 billion to $90 billion each year").
7 Nevertheless, in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, health care spending slowed, growing
more slowly than it has in fifty years, with early signs from fiscal year 2011 pointing the
same way. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, A Welcome Let-up in Health Costs That May Not
Last, YAHOO! NEWS (June 18, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/welcome-let-health-costs-may-
not-last-065238757--finance.html.
8 See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, "Promises to Keep ": Health Care Providers and the Civil
False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1363, 1372 (2002).
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overtreatment. 9 Overtreatment is best illustrated by scenarios in which a
provider allegedly administers inefficient, comparatively too expensive, or
unnecessary care to a patient. This may include performing an inpatient surgery
when it arguably should have been performed on an outpatient basis,' 0 ordering
a CT scan instead of trusting clinical judgment when the physician thinks, but is
not sure, that the patient does not have appendicitis," or prescribing brand-
name drugs for a patient's high cholesterol instead of the trusted generic
because of the doctor's belief that the generic is not as effective.12 Ironically,
even though many Americans demand more care from their doctors, the
practice of overtreatment is harmful to patients.13
Wasteful care is a major concern. In a recent survey, physicians noted that
$6.8 billion dollars are wasted annually on twelve commonly used, but
unnecessary, clinical tests. 14 The American College of Physicians has placed
the overall estimate of overtreatment far higher-estimating that as much as
$250 billion is wasted annually on all excessive testing and treatment.' 5 Still
others have estimated that as much as $700 billion-fully one-third of all
health-care expenditures in this country-is wasted on unnecessary or unneeded
medical services.16 The Institute of Medicine puts its estimate at $765 billion-
$210 billion due to unnecessary services, $130 billion due to inefficiently
9 SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED: WHY Too MUCH MEDICINE IS MAKING US
SICKER AND POORER 6 (2007).
10 See discussion infra Part VI.A.
11 See BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 150-53 (describing how the availability of clinical
imaging contributes to unnecessary tests).
12 See Michelle Andrews, Doctors Estimate $6.8 Billion in Unnecessary Medical Tests,
WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
doctors-estimate-68-billion-in-unnecessary-medical-tests/2011/10/28/gIQANpEXZM
story.html.
13 See BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 152 (noting that "a CT scan ... is only one piece of
information-and a potentially misleading one at that-which can fail to add much to a
careful clinical exam"); see also Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59
VAND. L. REv. 1137, 1138 n.4 (2006) ("Patients also can be harmed when doctors provide
too much care."); Kieke G.H. Okma, Health Care Systems in Transition: An International
Perspective, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1178, 1182 (2000) ("[G]ood access to health
care is essential, but too much intervention can be harmful and costly.").
14 Andrews, supra note 12 ("The activity most frequently performed without need was
a complete blood cell count at a routine physical exam. In 56[%] of routine physicals,
doctors inappropriately ordered such tests, accounting for $32.7 million in unnecessary
costs.").
15Press Release, MedSolutions, MedSolutions Responds to Choosing Wisely
Campaign, Which Highlights Unnecessary Tests and Procedures (Apr. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/idUS162843+05-Apr-2012+BW20120405.
16 BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 5 ("We spend between one fifth and one third of our
health care dollars, ... between five hundred and seven hundred billion dollars. . . , on care
that does nothing to improve our health."); see also id. at 37 (noting that as much as 30% of
"medical care that is paid for by Medicare as well as private insurers is useless, unneeded, a
waste-a figure that has been arrived at independently by other researchers").
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delivered services, $105 billion due to inflated prices, and (only) $75 billion due
to conventional health-care fraud.17 Whatever the actual number, much of the
overtreatment is characterized by different "tests, procedures, and drugs" whose
utility is largely dependent on the doctor's discretion.' 8 As a result, there are no
guidelines against their use in certain situations because "there are no hard-and-
fast rules about when to use them."' 9
The unsettling numbers have prompted providers to act. Spurred by Howard
Brody's provocative challenge to each subspecialty society to find "that
specialty's 'Top Five' list"-five of that specialty's commonly used procedures
that are often clinically unnecessary and are highly expensive 20-nine specialty
societies provided a list of forty-five tests and procedures that should be
curbed. 21 Compiled "after months of analyses and reviews of the medical
literature by expert committees," 22 these lists include stress tests during yearly
checkups for asymptomatic cardiac patients, antibiotics for most sinus
infections, universal and routine chest x-rays before surgery, two or more
colonoscopies within ten years of each other, and x-rays for non-serious low
back pain.23
Different from the doctor-driven effort, the federal government-mainly
through its attorneys at DOJ-has sought to curtail overtreatment through
investigations, threatened enforcement actions, and settlements with
providers.24 Specifically, the agencies tasked with overseeing the federal health-
care programs-Health and Human Services (HHS), the Office of Inspector
17 The Cost of Health Care: How Much Is Waste?, INST. MED. 1, http://iom.edu/
Reports/201 1/-/media/Files/widget/VSRT/healthcare-waste.swf (noting that, between 1999
and 2009, the average U.S. salary increased 38%, while health care premiums increased
131%).
18 See BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 60.
'9 Id.
20 Howard Brody, Medicine's Ethical Responsibility for Health Care Reform-The Top
Five List, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED., Jan. 28, 2010, at 284 (positing that each subspecialty
should come up with the specialty's "Top Five" list, which "would consist of five diagnostic
tests or treatments that are very commonly ordered by members of that specialty, that are
among the most expensive services provided, and that have been shown by the current
available evidence not to provide any meaningful benefit to at least some major categories of
patients for whom they are commonly ordered").
21 Roni Caryn Rabin, Doctor Panels Recommend Fewer Tests for Patients, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2012, at A10 (additionally, "[e]ight other specialty boards are preparing to follow
suit with additional lists of procedures their members should perform far less often").
22 Editorial, Do You Need That Test?: Doctors' Groups Make Pioneering Lists of
Unnecessary Tests and Treatments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/04/09/opinion/do-you-really-need-that-medical-test.html.
23 Brian Vastag, Doctors Groups Call for End to Unnecessary Procedures, WASH.
POsT (Apr. 4, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-checkup/post/
doctors-groups-call-for-end-to-unnecessary-procedures/2012/04/03/gIQAvrDptSblog.html.
Other unnecessary tests included CT scans-both for appendicitis in children and for
patients who have experienced recent fainting. Do You Need That Test?, supra note 22.
24 See discussion infra Parts V, VI.B.2 and accompanying notes.
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General (OIG), and the enforcement mechanisms at DOJ-are increasingly
using the tools traditionally reserved for the worst of the health-care fraudsters
against providers who have plainly administered too much care.25 As a result,
doctors who "do too much" may now be the target of civil False Claims Act 26
(FCA) investigations, 27 a practice that is likely to continue due to the
undeniably good return on investment for the government. 28
But daunting problems accompany this approach. Besides being a
temporary, piecemeal solution to the structural problems of overtreatment, three
components of this strategy combine to raise questions about its overall
legitimacy. First, in overtreatment enforcement actions, DOJ overly relies on a
process called "data mining," in which it searches for "outlier" providers and
statistical anomalies. 29 Doctors who administer procedures differently from the
majority quickly catch the attention of the government attorneys. Second,
through these cases, DOJ is attempting to set medical practice standards for
often new, highly complex, and contested areas of practice-areas of practice in
which the standard is still developing-with little or no clinical input.30 The line
between what is "fraudulent" and what is medically appropriate is difficult to
discern, especially because it is unsettled or in flux. Third, DOJ relies upon this
powerful weapon to compel quick settlements, no matter whether any actual
wrongdoing occurred. Because of the overwhelming statutory penalties built
into the FCA and other threatened administrative penalties that can "exclude"
providers from participation in the federal health-care programs, 31 no provider
is willing to take the risk of fighting the allegations to trial.
25 See id.
26 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).
27 Richard Doan argues that the scienter standard within the FCA is "eroding" due to
government overuse. Richard Doan, The False Claims Act and the Eroding Scienter in
Healthcare Fraud Litigation, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 49, 50 (2011). The treatment of the
new cases of overtreatment provide perhaps the most radical example of how the FCA has
been stretched to apply to many activities that may not be fairly characterized as
"fraudulent."
28Although most peg the return on investment at $7-to-$1, some note that the
government may make as much as $15 for each $1 it spends on anti-fraud enforcement
efforts. See Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Drug Firm Guilty in Criminal Case, Glaxo
Agrees To Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraud-
settlement.html?; see also Doan, supra note 27, at 58-59 ("These gains serve to encourage
the expansion of enforcement actions as well as the scope of anti-fraud laws.").
29 See Robert Radick, Claims Data and Health Care Fraud: The Controversy
Continues, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/
2012/09/25/claims-data-and-health-care-fraud-the-controversy-continues/ ("Data mining
techniques and investigations that stem from billing anomalies have been the bread and
butter of the federal government's Medicare Fraud Strike Force.").30 See discussion infra Part VI.B and accompanying notes.
31See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2010) (delineating the requirements of both mandatory and
permissive exclusions from the federal health care programs).
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As a result, the problems created by the "coercive" FCA settlements
articulated by Professor Joan Krause-specifically, that resulting FCA
settlements comprise "an amorphous collection of quasi-legal guidance with no
precedential value" and "an unofficial body of law comprised of legally
untested theories of falsity and fraud" 32-are exacerbated in the overtreatment
context. Further, these three components-which are prominent features of
DOJ's current overtreatment enforcement model-freeze the clinical practice
standard, stifle innovation, and ultimately change providers' behavior without
sufficiently consulting current clinical standards.
In this Article, I will examine America's overtreatment challenge while
evaluating its newest solution of increasing the application of the FCA. To
accomplish this task, Part II will present the problem by examining the
American health-care system by the numbers, focusing particularly on its
problem of compounding costs as a result of overtreatment. Part III will
introduce the FCA, a potent weapon for any U.S. attorney fighting health-care
fraud, and a weapon that the Obama administration has leaned on quite heavily
in achieving headline-grabbing settlements with, and verdicts against, various
health-care providers and companies. Part IV will review the modem
application of the FCA to a relatively new class of cases, the "quality of care"
cases. Part V will introduce and detail DOJ's ongoing implantable cardioverter
defibrillator (ICD) investigation, a case study reflecting the current enforcement
model. Finally, in Part VI, the application of the FCA to overtreatment will be
critiqued, highlighting major problems associated with achieving enforcement
in this way.
II. THE CURRENT PROGNOSIS
A. The Crisis
It has been a common refrain in 21st-century America: American health
care-and in particular, government-paid-for health care (Medicaid and
Medicare)-is broken. 33 As it creeps ever closer, Medicare insolvency is now
32 Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of
Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REv. 121, 205-06 (2001).33 See Leslie Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Steams, Commerce Games and the
Individual Mandate, 100 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1123 (2012) ("During the 2008 Presidential
primaries, candidates from both ends of the political spectrum agreed on one thing: The
American health care system was broken and demanded urgent reform."); Andrew
Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care
Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 24 (Apr. 26, 2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-
law-joural-pocket-part/constitutional-law/bad-news-for-mail-robbers:-the-obvious-
constitutionality-of-health-care-reform/ (noting that Congress "took on the spectacularly
broken American system of health care delivery" through passage of the Affordable Care
Act in 2010); Jonathan Mann, Obama's Deadly Enemy Within, CNN (May 15, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-05-15/politics/pm.obama.healthcarelhealthcare-health-
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twelve years away.34 The nation's leaders constantly warn of the surely coming
doom. "Leaving Medicare and Social Security on auto pilot and allowing them
to continue to grow beyond their means is no longer an option," Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-UT) said recently. 35 Senator Tom Coburn's (R-OK) 2011 op-ed in the
New York Post was entitled, "Reform or Go Broke: Medicaid, Medicare Must
Change." 36 The nation's leaders on the other side of the aisle agree, albeit in
less pessimistic terms. "We can make Medicare solvent again. We don't have to
gut it to make it last," Vice President Joseph Biden said early last year.37 Of
course, the refrain has been virtually unchanged for two decades: "[t]his health
care system of ours is badly broken, and it is time to fix it," then-President
Clinton declared in 1993.38
Nevertheless, not only are the federal health-care programs speeding toward
bankruptcy, but the quality of U.S. health care is mediocre, the headlines say.
"Healthcare in the United States is the most expensive in the world,"
newspapers scream, "but it's not the best."39 A May 2012 piece in the Atlantic
asks "What's the Matter with Health Care and Education?" 40 The article
continues, "[i]t is well-known that when the total cost of the American health
care system is divided by the size of our population, we have one of the most
expensive health care systems in the world."41 And when it comes to quality,
"[t]he outcomes for the average client are just average in an international
context, and the outcomes for those clients with scarce financial resources are
comparable to the health outcomes for the citizens of third world countries," the
insurance-system-obama-s-administration ("Our healthcare system is broken," President
Obama noted four months after taking office.).
34 See Noam N. Levey, Social Security Is Slipping Closer to Insolvency, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/24/nation/la-na-medicare-report-
20120424 ("Medicare, which will provide health insurance to more than 50 million elderly
and disabled Americans this year, is expected to start operating in the red in its largest fund
in 2024. . .
35 d.
36Tom Coburn, Reform or Go Broke: Medicaid, Medicare Must Change, N.Y. POsT
(Apr. 6, 2011, 12:33 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/
reform orgo brokeAxZmLn5iEzaEZohOJPB23J.
37Curt Anderson, Biden: GOP Changes Threaten Medicare for Millions, CNS NEWS
(Mar. 23, 2012), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/biden-gop-changes-threaten-medicare-
millions.
3Catherine Rampell, Bill Clinton on Health Care, 1993, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 9, 2009,
6:59 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/bill-clinton-on-health-care-1993/.
39Tiffany Hsu, US. Healthcare Costs the Most but Isn't the Best: Report, L.A. TIMES
(May 3, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-healthcare-
costs-20120503,0,6063895.story.
4 0 Marc Tucker, American Dinosaurs: What's the Matter with Health Care and
Education, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://www.the atlantic.com/business/
arch ive/2012/05/american-dinosaurs-whats-the-matter-with-health-care-and-
education/256807/.
41 Id.
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article notes.42 In 2011, HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius frankly noted that
"[w]e pay 2 V2 times what anybody else pays in the world, and our care
outcomes look like we're in a developing country." 43
Unfortunately, much of the gloomy rhetoric is well-supported by data. A
2011 study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)" concluded that the United States "spends two-and-a-half times more
than the OECD average health expenditure per person," including "twice as
much as France," amounting to 17.4% of its GDP in 2009.45 This is "by far the
highest share in the OECD."46 This number is only expected to rise-in six
years, health-care spending may increase to about 20% of America's GDP; by
2040, it is forecast to hit 34%.47 According to the OECD, two factors contribute
to the crisis: (1) health-care costs "substantially higher" in America than other
countries, and (2) the United States provides more health care to its citizenry. 48
Most disappointingly, America's additional care does not result in better health.
The study found life expectancy in the United States to be "below the OECD
average" (78.2 years in the United States to 79.5 years as the OECD average). 49
America was also below average in "infant mortality and potential years of life
lost."5 0 The United States is particularly deficient in providing quality primary
care, which results in frequent and expensive hospital admissions.5'
42 Id
43 Sarah Kliff, Kathleen Sebelius: Health Care Outcomes in U.S. Like 'a Developing
Country', POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2011, 4:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0311/52339.html.
4 OECD, or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, is made
up of the following thirty-four countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, and United States. See ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HEALTH AT A
GLANCE 2011: OECD INDICATORS 20 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/els/health-
systems/49105858.pdf.
4 5 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2011: OECD
INDICATORS, WHY Is HEALTH SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES So HIGH? 1 (2011)
[hereinafter U.S. HEALTH AT A GLANCE], available at http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/
49084355.pdf.
4 6 ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2011: OECD
INDICATORS, KEY FINDINGS: UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/12/58/49084319.pdf.
47 See Peter J. Kalis & Judy Hlafcsak, Healthcare Reform: Let's Act Locally, 50 DuQ.
L. REv. 253, 257 (2012) ("By 2018, healthcare spending is projected to rise to nearly $4.3
trillion, which is approximately 20% of GDP. This percentage is projected to reach 34% by
2040, if costs continue to grow at historic rates.").
48 See U.S. HEALTH AT A GLANCE, supra note 45, at 4.
49 Id. at 6.50 d
51 See id. ("The United States performs well in some subsystems such as cancer care
and treating acute conditions in hospitals, but does not perform well in primary care and in
preventing costly hospital admissions for chronic conditions."); see also BROWNLEE, supra
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The OECD study found that even though the United States has fewer
practicing physicians, doctor consultations, hospital beds, hospital discharges,
and average hospital stays than the OECD per capita average, 52 the United
States "does do a lot of interventions," "has a lot of expensive diagnostic
equipment, which it uses a lot," and "does a lot of elective surgery-the sort of
activities where it is not always clear-cut about whether a particular intervention
is necessary or not." 53 To this end, the United States performs double the rate of
MRI exams (ranking second of thirty-four), nearly double the number of
tonsillectomies (second), and more than double the number of coronary
angioplasties (third), than the OECD average. 54
Results of recent studies of physicians have echoed and furthered the
OECD findings. According to a study published in the Archives of Internal
Medicine, twelve commonly used and unnecessary treatments totaled $6.8
billion in 2009.55 The unnecessary expense has two main sources: (1)
prescription drugs and (2) services and care. More than 85% of the $6.8 billion
figure was drug-related, blamed on physicians "ordering brand-name statins
before trying patients on a generic drug first." 56 This represented $5.8 billion of
the nearly $7 billion total. 57 In a second study of primary care physicians
published in the Archives of Internal Medicine that relied on a national survey,
42% of doctors replied that their patients "were receiving too much medical
care."58 Twenty-eight percent responded that they were "ordering more tests
and making more referrals to specialists than they would 'ideally like to be.' 59
Newer numbers from the American College of Physicians put the overall
cost of excessive testing far higher-from between $200 to $250 billion per
year.60 This would constitute 7-9% of the overall $2.7 trillion health-care
note 9, at 65 (noting that lack of primary care creates "barely controlled chaos of multiple
caretakers," that "doesn't work well when there is no single individual, in particular no
generalist, who's in charge of coordinating a patient's care").
52 See U.S. HEALTH AT A GLANCE, supra note 45, at 5 (noting that the United States
only has 2.4 physicians, 3.1 hospital beds, and 130.9 discharges per 1,000 population and its
average hospital stay is 4.9 days).
53 Id.
54d
55 See Andrews, supra note 12 (documenting physician survey).
56jd
57 See id.
58 Karen Kaplan, Some Doctors Blame Themselves for Rising Healthcare Costs, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/27/news/la-heb-doctors-
aggressive-medicine-20110927.
59d
60See Debra Sherman, Stemming the Tide of Overtreatment in U.S. Healthcare,
REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/16/us-
overtreatment-idUSTRE8 1 FOUF20120216 (Dr. Steven Weinberger of the American College
of Physicians attributes the causes of the waste to "imaging studies, CT scans for lung
disease, overuse of routine electrocardiograms and other cardiac tests such as stress
testing.").
472 [Vol. 74:3
CARING TOO MUCH
budget in 2011.61 Others put the total cost of waste still higher-MIT health-
care economist Dr. Jonathan Gruber estimates that about $800 billion---or one-
third of the overall health-care budget-is wasted on unnecessary care. 62 By
way of example, in order to effectively screen for and prevent colorectal cancer,
the CDC recommends one of three tests-a colonoscopy every ten years, a
flexible sigmoidoscopy every five years, or a stool test annually. 63 Even though
the stool test costs $10 and the colonoscopy costs $3,000, the colonoscopy is the
test most frequently used.64 An examination into why American providers order
more tests and administer more care-a phenomenon which undeniably affects
the cost of health care and the viability of federal health-care programs in this
country-follows.
B. Why "More?"
This phenomenon-that American providers administer more care than any
other OECD country-may be best attributed to four interrelated factors: (1) the
financial incentives that exist for providers to do more, and the absence of cost
pressures that would influence patient behavior; (2) the inefficient and
uncoordinated structure of the delivery of American health care; (3) the effect
of technology and supply on the practice of medicine; and (4) the demands of
patients themselves, which can lead to the practice of defensive medicine.
1. Financial Incentives
First, and most importantly, incentives exist on both sides of the hospital
bed that contribute to overtreatment. As Professor David Orentlicher has
recently noted, "structural features . . . foster the high prices and high volumes
that characterize American health care."65 Patients "have too great an incentive
to seek care" due to the fact that insurance will cover and obscure much of the
cost of a health-care procedure 66 This is known as "moral hazard."67 Because
61 See National Health Expenditures 2011 Highlights, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Apr.
20, 2013) (noting that Medicare spending in 2011 was $554.3 billion, and Medicaid
spending totaled $407.7 billion).
62 See Sherman, supra note 60 (Gruber blames "unnecessary diagnostic tests,
procedures and extra days in the hospital" for his nearly $800 billion total in health care
waste).63 See id.
64 See id.
65 David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 6 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 67, 71 (2010).
66 Id
67 See Charles P. Litchfield, Note, Taxing Youth: Health Care Reform Writes a Costly
Prescription That Leaves the Young and Healthy Paying the Bill, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 353,
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consumer-patients have little conception of the cost other than the copay for
which they are responsible, there is no incentive to limit consumption or shop
for the best cost.68 In fact, not only are patient-consumers unaware of and
uninterested in the cost of medical procedures, but others have pointed out that
having insurance actually encourages detrimental behavior. Indeed, "insurance
both caus[es] people to overuse medical care and [causes] them to take risks
they might have avoided had they been uninsured." 69
Additionally, physicians are not incentivized to make cost-effective
treatment decisions. Physicians and other providers who enjoy a fee-for-service
reimbursement method "are paid more for doing more." 70 Doctors with higher
utilization of tests and procedures enjoy greater reimbursement.7 ' As Professor
Orentlicher notes, inversely, "[w]hen physicians are paid a salary, they are less
likely to order lab tests, request radiologic scans or perform surgeries." 72
As a result, as Brownlee points out, the system fails to reward hospitals and
physicians "for keeping patients safe[,] . . . coordinating their care[, or] for
retaining the right mix of specialists and primary care physicians." 73 Instead,
"physicians and hospitals are paid, by and large, to do more, and distortions in
what gets reimbursed most richly have ensured that the simplest, most effective
care often falls through the cracks in favor of more-invasive, complicated
treatment." 74 Americans continue to pay for expensive acute care, instead of
inexpensive preventative care. 75
361 (2012) (noting that insurance coverage gives individuals a "decreased incentive to avoid
losses that are covered . .. [creating] the problem of moral hazard").68 See Orentlicher, supra note 65, at 71.
69Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1873, 1892 (2011);
see also Litchfield, supra note 67, at 361-62 ("Generally, moral hazard refers to the natural
human inclination to engage in immoral, risky, or inappropriate behavior because there is
ultimately no negative consequence. Theoretically, moral hazard manifests in health
insurance in two ways: (1) benefits that cover certain preventable hearth risks decrease the
incentive to avoid such risks; and (2) excessive benefits encourage overutilization and
expensive care choices because people generally will try to get the most value out of their
insurance benefits, even if it means choosing a less efficient treatment option." (citations
omitted)).70 Orentlicher, supra note 65, at 71.
71 See Kalis & Hlafcsak, supra note 47, at 258 ("Perhaps most notably, our payment
system rewards medical utilization-we pay for procedures and tests... . Physicians only
remain in business if they are treating and testing patients.").
72 Orentlicher, supra note 65, at 72.
73 BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 70.
74 Id.
75 See id.; Kalis & Hlafcsak, supra note 47, at 258 ("We pay for acute episodic care,
rather than paying for outcomes, prevention, and wellness.").
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2. Fragmentation
Second, the American health-care system is not well-configured for
optimum efficiency. Rather, it is fragmented, with a lack of communication and
collaboration among providers.76 In a recent survey, 40% of physicians reported
that "they didn't get to spend enough time with their patients to figure out what
is really wrong with them, so they ordered tests and consultations to provide
some of the answers."77 Instead of collaboration, there is suspicion among
providers: 61% of the primary care physicians believed subspecialists provided
too much care, and 62% noted that subspecialists "would cut back on testing in
the absence of a financial incentive." 78
According to economist Alain Enthoven, such "systemic fragmentation is
difficult to dislodge" because it is "steeped in the history and culture of
medicine and is embedded population-wide in the current system-
operationally, financially, and in the clinic." 79 By "revering physician autonomy
and infallibility," medical training focuses on "individual rather than team
performance."80 As a result, "physicians tend to practice as individuals." 81 The
aging populace and technological advances-which result in a need for
increased numbers of specialists-have also contributed to the crisis. As Dr.
Enthoven notes,
The accelerating advances and complexity of modem healthcare have driven
greater specialization and a "silo approach" to healthcare consistent with the
described isolationist history and professional culture. Yet, in recent years,
increasingly prevalent chronic, often comorbid conditions ([e.g.,] diabetes,
heart failure, depression) require that patients receive care from multiple
providers in multiple settings. Although intensified specialization sought to
generate greater interdependence among clinicians and the need for cross-silo
coordination, greater specialization has exacerbated fragmentation by
increasing the number of narrowly trained specialists.82
76 See Kalis & Hlafcsak, supra note 47, at 259.
77 Kaplan, supra note 58.78 Id
79 Alain C. Enthoven, Integrated Delivery Systems: The Cure for Fragmentation, 15
AM. J. MANAG. CARE S284, S284 (2009), available at http://www.ajmc.com/publications/
supplement/2009/a264_09dec-hlthpolicycvrone/a264 09dec enthovens284to290/1 (last
visited Aug. 3, 2012).
8 0 1d
81Id; see also BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 9 ("We've never structured the delivery
system to ensure that patients get all of the treatments and procedures they need and aren't
subjected to care they don't.").82 Enthoven, supra note 79, at S285.
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The shortage of primary care physicians (the United States is expected to
experience a 63,000 shortage of primary care physicians in 2015)83 results in a
lack of coordination of care. Instead, "[o]ne doctor often doesn't know that
another physician has already ordered a battery of tests, or that they have both
prescribed two different drugs that do the same thing."84
3. Technology and Supply-Driven Demand
Perhaps surprisingly, America's state-of-the-art equipment and its
technological breakthroughs also contribute to health-care waste. This cause
comprises two highly related factors. First, technological advances-of which
the United States enjoys many-drive up the prices of services, and second,
when hospitals and clinics acquire new machinery and cutting-edge equipment,
utilization of the more expensive services, predictably, rises.
Unlike many other industries,85 technological innovation in health care
actually drives prices higher-resulting in "technology-driven cost inflation." 86
There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon-from patients' lack of
control and information to patients' and physicians' lack of price sensitivity,
to-for life-saving or life-prolonging procedures-a feeling that most
Americans would not be comfortable with a health-care system that universally
limits all procedures to only those with a demonstrated ability to pay.87
Particularly in health care, low prices "may even create the perception of low
quality," which eliminates "the normal market incentive for health-care
suppliers to create innovative low-cost treatments."88
Second, the availability of tests and equipment often directly results in
overutilization.89 Brownlee notes that "hospitals in cities and towns across the
83 See Patience Haggin, Doctor Shortage?, TIME, Aug. 13, 2012, at 26 (noting that
"residency training has been frozen" and "interest in becoming a primary-care physician has
plummeted; the field's grueling hours and relatively low pay have given it a 'second-class
status"'); see also Brody, supra note 20, at 285 (noting that the primary care shortage can be
blamed at least in part on "the income gap between that field and others").84 BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 9.85 See DIANA FARRELL ET AL., McKINSEY&CO. GLOBAL INST, ACCOUNTING FOR THE
COST OF US HEALTH CARE: A NEW LOOK AT WHY AMERICANS SPEND MORE 29 (2008),
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/americas/accountingfor-the_
cost of us health-care (consumer electronics is given as a prime example).
86 M.
8 7See id. at 102.88 Id
89 Increased overutilization may also result in worse care. This is evident in examples
in which the physician orders imaging tests in all cases of suspected infection instead of
relying on clinical judgment in all cases except the ones in which he or she is unsure. Given
the error rate of imaging-and the propensities for false negatives-the physician relying on
imaging tests for all patients is going to incorrectly classify a group of individuals as needing
intervention when they do not. See BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 153.
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country are engaged in a medical-technology arms race" 90 in which each health
system seeks the newest equipment. "When hospitals buy faster machines . .. it
lowers the barrier for physicians to order yet another unnecessary test, setting
up a vicious cycle." 91
There is further evidence that supply is driving demand in health care.
While examining cardiology procedures, researchers found "an almost-perfect
correlation between the availability of catheterization labs in a region and the
propensity for patients to be given angioplasty or bypass surgery." 92 Relatedly,
researchers have also shown that providers' decision to admit patients is (often
unknowingly) tied to whether there are hospital beds available. As a result,
providers admit "patients who are less ill and [let] them stay longer when there
is a place for them." 93 Researchers have found that in hospitals with fewer
available beds, fewer Medicare admission rates have resulted.94 This suggests
that the more expensive equipment, the more clinics, even the more hospital
beds in a given health center, the more overtreatment is likely to result.
4. Defensive Medicine and Demanding Patients
Finally, although a contested cause of increased expense, 95 some argue that
the practice of "defensive medicine"-in which additional tests are ordered to
protect the wary physician from a medical malpractice lawsuit should the
patient's health decline-causes unnecessary care. On the heels of its study,
Mattias Rumpf, the OECD's Chief Media Officer for the United States and
Canada, noted that in countries "where there is a greater stress on controlling
costs, and different tort law rules, there are fewer such interventions" than in the
United States. 96 Still, correlation does not prove causation, and many peg the
cost of defensive medicine as quite low-from a comparatively meager $13
billion97 to no more than about $50 billion annually.98
9 0 1d at 163.
91 Id9 2 Id. at 108.
93 Id. at 113.
94 See id. at 112-13.
95 See Orentlicher, supra note 65, at 72 ("For example, the legal costs from medical
malpractice are less than [1%] of total health care costs, and defensive medicine also
represents a very small part of the health care budget.").
96 Sarah Clune & Jason Kane, Why Does Health Care Cost So Much in the United
States?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 25, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
rundown/201 1/1 1/why-does-healthcare-cost-so-much.html.
9 7 Rene Letourneau, Defensive Medicine Costs Billions, HEALTHCARE FIN. NEws, Nov.
2011, at 23 (noting that Professor J. William Thomas of the Muskie School of Public Policy
in Portland, Maine argues that the "Jackson Healthcare estimates of defensive medicine
costs are significantly higher than those based on current research").
9 8 See Micah L. Berman, Foreword: Improving Patient Safety and Providing Fair
Compensation, 46 NEW ENG. L. REv. 409, 410 (2012), (citing Michelle M. Mello et al.,
National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1569 (2010))
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Nevertheless, doctors themselves seem to think defensive medicine plays a
major role in causing overtreatment, resulting in inflated costs. The nationwide
survey of primary care physicians found that 76% of doctors said "fear of
malpractice lawsuits prompted them to practice more aggressive medicine." 99 A
2005 Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA) study of specialists
practicing in "high-liability specialties" found that 93% "reported practicing
defensive medicine"-a particular cause of which was "assurance behavior." 00
Further, a study published in the Archives of Internal Medicine (AIM) in 2010
found that 91% of physicians believe that defensive medicine exists, resulting in
the administration of "more tests and procedures than necessary."' 0 ' Dr. Tara
Bishop, one of the co-authors of the AIM study, was quoted as saying that
"[a]bout $60 billion is spent annually on defensive medicine and many
physicians feel they are vulnerable to malpractice lawsuits even when they
practice competently within the standard of care."' 02
According to physicians, overtreatment is particularly prevalent in
America's radiology departments: emergency room physicians order tests that
are not needed, and radiologists "run patients through scanners even when they
know they shouldn't because other physicians asked for the test."10 3 According
to Brownlee, "the two reasons doctors give most often for why they do so much
excess imaging are patient demand and worries about malpractice suits."1 04
Other numbers reflect this: in the JAMA study, 59% of the survey's respondents
said "they often ordered more diagnostic tests than were medically
indicated." 05 Physicians reported relying on technology to "pacify demanding
patients, bolster their own self-confidence, or create a trail of evidence that they
had confirmed or excluded particular disease entities."1 06 Interestingly,
overtreatment causes even more overtreatment by changing the standard of care.
(estimating, while acknowledging that empirical evidence was limited, that "the total cost of
defensive medicine was less than [2%] of overall healthcare costs"); Julie Rovner, Costs of
Defensive Medicine May Be Overstated, NPR HEALTH BLOG (Sept. 7, 2010, 4:45 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/09/07/129706676/defensive-medicine-not-as-much-
as-the-doctor-ordered-after-all (noting that Mello's total was about 80% of $55.6 billion per
year-which totals about $44.5 billion).
99 Kaplan, supra note 58.
100 David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians
in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (June 1, 2005), available at
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=200994.
101 Press Release, Mount Sinai, Vast Majority of Physical Practice 'Defensive Medicine'
According to Physicians Survey (June 28, 2010), available at http://mountsinai.org/about-
us/newsroom/press-releases/vast-majority-of-physicians-practice'"defensive-medicine"-
according-to-new-physician-survey, reprinted in Vast Majority of Physicians Practice
'Defensive Medicine, According to Physician Survey, SCIENCEDAILY (July 1, 2010),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/06/100629094155.htm.
102 Id
103 BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 154.
104 Id
105 Studdert et al., supra note 100, at 2612.106 1d. at 2616.
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The JAMA study found that the "more physicians order tests or perform
diagnostic procedures with low predictive values or provide aggressive
treatment for low-risk conditions, the more likely such practices are to become
the legal standard of care."10 7
America's often-demanding patients-taking what they have heard about a
particular procedure or drug from television advertisements or trusted
neighbors-contribute to this phenomenon. According to Brownlee:
Doctors say that when a patient demands a test, they often comply-even when
they know the test is not warranted. It's easier to acquiesce than to explain why
a CT scan won't necessarily help diagnose appendicitis, or why the doctor is
certain that the patient's ankle is sprained, not broken, and doesn't need to be
X-rayed, or why an MRI won't change the fact that the first remedy for mild
back pain is ice, over-the-counter pain medication, and normal activity. As one
emergency physician who is a pediatric specialist tells me, he'd rather send a
child to radiology than fight with the kid's parents, who will only think he's
incompetent because they know their child needs a scan. 108
C. Recovering Money Through the Fraud Statutes
As America's health-care costs have grown, the federal government has
reacted with an ever-increasing focus on conventional health-care fraudi09
even though it constitutes only a portion of overall health-care expenditures."10
Nevertheless, it is popular and cost-effective, and DOJ and HHS have
developed innovative ways to find and penalize a number of participants in the
health-care administration and delivery industries."' Likely because it is so
cost-effective and politically attractive, the government first began sweeping in
providers and participants who engaged in behavior that contributed to the
mediocre (substandard) care that many Americans receive, and now is targeting
those who provide too much care to patients by government standards.
Months after taking his new job, Attorney General Holder noted that "every
year [America loses] tens of billions of dollars in Medicare and Medicaid funds
107Jd.
108 BROWNLEE, supra note 9, at 157-58.
109 See Yeung, supra note 5. Both the number of cases and total settlement amounts
have risen dramatically since President Obama's inauguration. Id.
110Conventional fraud constitutes only about 10% of the total estimated cost of
unnecessary care. See The Cost ofHealth Care, supra note 17.
11 1 See Kelly Kennedy, Fight Against Health Care Fraud Recovers $4. 1B, USA TODAY
(Feb. 14, 2012, 8:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-
14/sebelius-holder-announce-health-care-fraud-money/53097474/1; see also Anatomy of a
Fraud Bust: From Investigation to Conviction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th
Cong. 3 (2012) [hereinafter Anatomy of a Fraud Bust] (testimony of Daniel R. Levinson,
Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/
testimony/docs/2012/levinson testimony_04242012.pdf.
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to fraud." 1l2 To address the problem, in May 2009, the administration
announced the HEAT initiative-the "Heath Care Fraud Prevention and
Enforcement Action Team"-as a joint taskforce between the Justice
Department and the Department of Health and Human Services.11 3 Holder went
on to note that the new initiative bolstered the fight against fraud "by launching
a new effort with increased tools, resources and a sustained focus by senior-
level leadership."l14 HEAT sought to increase efficiency and information
exchange between the two agencies, and Holder noted that the team would
"continue to combine and leverage the resources of both Departments, including
the FBI and the Office of Inspector General at HHS, to prevent and prosecute
fraud."I 5 Holder took his lead from President Obama; the President has spoken
out against the scourge of health-care fraud, noting that "[t]he health care
system has billions of dollars that should go to patient care, and they're lost
each and every year to fraud and abuse and massive subsidies that line the
pockets of the insurance company executives."ll 6
The increased focus and hard work has resulted in several prosecutions and
recoveries. In 2010, the government's efforts led to over $4 billion in health-
care fraud recoveries.1l 7 In 2011, the government collected $4.1 billion as a
result of its health-care anti-fraud efforts, including $2.4 billion in recoveries
under the FCA alone.118 Continuing the trend, in 2012, the government
recovered $4.2 billion from health-care fraud prosecutions and settlements.119
Further, in 2011, the HEAT taskforce's work "sent 175 people to prison," 20
and the total number of individuals charged with health-care fraud was 1430 in
2011-up from 797 in 2008.121
112 Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Attorney General Holder on New Medicare Fraud
Initiative at a Press Conference with HHS Secretary Sebelius, JusT. NEWS (May 20, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090520.html.
113 See id.
114Id.
1151
116Helene Cooper & Robert Pear, Obama Gets Tough on Health Care Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/1 1/health/policy/i lhealth.html.
l7 See Kelly Kennedy, Health Care Fraud Prosecutions on Pace to Rise 85%, USA
TODAY (Aug. 29, 2011, 9:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/201 1-
08-29/Health-care-fraud-prosecutions-on-pace-to-rise-85/50180282/1. In fact, in Fiscal Year
2010, according to DOJ, all False Claims Act recoveries totaled $3 billion-with health care
related False Claims Act recoveries totaling $2.5 billion, or 83%, of the total. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims
Cases in Fiscal Year 2010 (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/
2010/November/10-civ-1335.html.
118 See Kennedy, supra note 111.
119See Chad Terhune, Report: U.S. Recovered $4.2 Billion from Healthcare Fraud in
2012, L.A. TIMES, (Feb. 11, 2013), http://articles.1atimes.com/2013/feb/11/business/la-fi-
mo-healthcare-fraud-20130211.
120 See Kennedy, supra note 111.
121 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., HHS, Dep't of Justice
Highlight Obama Administration Efforts, Health Reform Tools to Combat Medicare Fraud,
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The government continues to pour resources into fighting health-care fraud.
In February 2012, Secretary Sebelius noted that an additional $300 million
would be budgeted to pay for new and expanded HEAT teams nationwide.122 It
was an uncontroversial investment: for every dollar the U.S. government spent
preventing and prosecuting fraud between 2009 and 2011, it recovered $7.20.123
Additionally, the recently upheld 24 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Affordable Care Act, ACA)125 includes an increase in funding of $350 million
over ten years to "ramp up anti-fraud efforts, including increasing scrutiny of
claims before they've been paid, investments in sophisticated data analytics,
and an increased number of law enforcement agents and others to fight fraud in
the health-care system."126
Finally, in the summer of 2012, President Obama announced a new
partnership between the federal government and major insurance companies.127
Called the National Fraud Prevention Partnership (Partnership), federal officials
(including individuals from the Federal Bureau of Investigation), two major
trade organizations for the industry,128 and private insurers "will pool claims
data and look for suspicious billing patterns and aberrations." 29 The
Partnership will provide the opportunity for a "trusted third party" 130-hired by
(Apr. 4, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/04/20120404a.html.
Total prosecutions jumped nearly 69% from FY 2010 to FY 2011. See Syracuse Univ.,
Record Number of Federal Criminal Health Care Fraud Prosecutions Filed in FY 2011,
TRAC REPs. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/270/.
122 See Kennedy, supra note 111.
123 See id. This is up from $5.10 per dollar recovered between 1997 and 2008, according
to the article. See Anatomy of a Fraud Bust, supra note 111, at 7 ("This strategy has resulted
in significant accomplishments, including achieving a return on investment of more than $7
to $1 over the past 3 years.").
124 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding the
Affordable Care Act's penalty provision under Congress' near-plenary tax and spending
power, but declaring unconstitutionally coercive the enforcement mechanism with respect to
the required expansion of Medicaid).
125 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
126 New Tools to Fight Fraud, Strengthen Federal and Private Health Programs, and
Protect Consumer and Taxpayer Dollars, HEALTHCARE (Mar. 15, 2012), http://
www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/03/fraud03 152011 a.html.
127See Robert Pear, Obama and Insurers Join to Cut Health Care Fraud, N.Y. TIMES
July 25, 2012, at Al8 (noting that "federal investigators and insurers will pool claims data
and look for suspicious billing patterns and aberrations.").
128 According to the New York Times, the two trade organizations expected to join the
Partnership are America's Health Insurance Plans and the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Association. See id
1291dy
130 T.R. Goldman, Health Policy Brief HEALTH AFF. (July 31, 2012),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?briefid=72 (noting that some
have been critical of third-party contractors on which the government relies to investigate
potential fraud allegations). However, some third-party contractors have been criticized for
their often aggressive work:
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the federal government-to look at claims data from the federal health-care
programs as well as private insurance in an effort to detect anomalies,1 31 which
will undoubtedly result in additional investigations.
III. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A HISTORICAL SUMMARY
The federal government's most potent weaponl 32 against health-care fraud
has had a long and eventful lifespan. Created during the American Civil War in
an effort to prevent individuals from selling defective equipment to Union
soldiers,133 the modern FCA came into being in 1986, following Congressional
amendments that increased penalties, sweetened whistleblower incentives and
protections, and broadened the scope of punishable offenses. 134 Since 1986, the
government has recovered more than $27 billion under this strengthened
FCA.135 The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009,136 the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act137 and the Affordable Care
Act have further expanded offenses and strengthened whistleblower protections
within the Act. 138
Some providers complain that overzealous contractors, motivated to find problems by
their contingent fee arrangement with CMS, focus on technical mistakes rather than
outright wrongdoing. There have also been complaints that contractors are too quick to
determine that paid claims are improper, necessitating the spending of thousands of
dollars in expensive provider appeals that can take up to two years to resolve. In
response to these concerns, CMS is auditing the work of its contractors for accuracy and
has also required the contractors to increase the medical credentials of their staff to
improve the credibility of their actions.
Id.
131 See Pear, supra note 127, at A18.132 In 2011, the civil False Claims Act brought in $2.4 billion of the $4.1 billion total in
health care fraud recoveries and settlements. See Kennedy, supra note 111.
133 See Krause, supra note 32, at 129-30 (detailing the history of the FCA).
134See CHRISTINA W. FLEPS, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE COMPLIANCE MANUAL
§ 2:38 (Supp. 2012).
135 See id. § 2:39.
136 See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat.
1617, 1621 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 27 (2009)) (amending False Claims Act
provisions at 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006) and other sections of the United States Code).
137 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1079A, 124 Stat. 1376, 2079 (2010) (amending False Claims Act provisions at 31
U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006) and other sections of the United States Code).
138 FLEPS, supra note 134, § 2:38. Perhaps the ACA's biggest change to FCA
enforcement linked the Anti-Kickback Statute to the FCA. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(g)
(West 2013) ("In addition to the penalties provided for in this section or section 1320a-7a of
this title, a claim that includes items or services resulting from a violation of this section
constitutes a false or fraudulent claim for purposes of subchapter III of chapter 37 of Title
31."). This change explicitly recognized that a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute could
constitute a predicate claim for an FCA violation. See id
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In addition to other provisions, the FCA imposes liability on "any person
who (A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval" or any individual who "(B) knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false
or fraudulent claim," or one who
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government. 139
"Knowingly," in this context, means that an individual "has actual knowledge
of the information," "acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information," or "acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information." 40 The FCA mandates a minimum penalty of $5,500 and a
maximum penalty of $11,000 for each claim "plus three times the amount of
damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person."' 41
What makes the FCA unique-and especially potent-is its qui taml42
provision, which allows private persons to bring actions on behalf of the
government.143 Once the private individual has filed a claim, the government
can intervene and proceed with the action as the plaintiff.144 If the government
intervenes, however, the private plaintiff is still entitled to between 15 and 25%
of the recovery.145 Finally, the statute allows the government to issue civil
13931 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).
140 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2006). Gross negligence "plus" is required to demonstrate the
requisite intent. See United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 945 n.12 (10th
Cir. 2008) ("An aggravated form of gross negligence (i.e. reckless disregard) will satisfy the
scienter requirement for an FCA violation."); United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding the scienter requirement of gross negligence "plus" and noting
that "as the statute explicitly states that specific intent is not required, it is logical to
conclude that reckless disregard in this context is not a 'lesser form of intent,' . . .but an
extreme version of ordinary negligence" (citation omitted)); Crane Helicopter Servs., Inc. v.
United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 410, 433 n.26 (1999) ("[U]nder the False Claims Act, reckless
disregard may be considered the equivalent of 'aggravated form of gross negligence, or
gross negligence-plus."' (citations omitted)).
14131 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2013). The statute actually requires the minimum
penalty to be $5,000 per claim and the maximum penalty as $10,000 per claim, but these
amounts were adjusted for inflation in 1999. See 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(9)(2012).
142"Qui tam is an abbreviation for the maxim qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso
in hac parte sequitur, or 'who pursues this action does so on the behalf of our Lord the King
as well as on his own behalf."' BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 1183 (Stephen M. Sheppard ed.,
2011).
143 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006).
144 1d. § 3730(b)(2).
145 Id. § 3730(d)(1).
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investigative demands, which are powerful tools forcing private litigants to
produce documents or provide testimony. 146
The FCA has figured particularly prominently in modem health-care
recoveries. Called "a significant deterrence against fraud," 47 "merciless," 1 48
"potent," 49 and a "weapon of choice in combating fraud and abuse in
healthcare today,"o50 the FCA is an old tool that has been stretched to apply to
America's modem patchwork that constitutes the health-care industry. As such,
the application of the FCA to health-care fraud is a (relatively) new and
somewhat uncomfortable phenomenon.151 The fit between the FCA's stark,
brutal statutory penalties and modern health care's complex web of actors and
their decisions-often whose culpability levels are unclear-is not perfect, but
the government enjoys application of the old fraud statute to an industry in
which fraud is allegedly "everywhere."l 52 Further, the federal government has
encouraged states to enact their own anti-fraud statutes based on the federal
FCA as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.153 As a result, many states
have enthusiastically and increasingly sought to apply their own "state false
claims acts" in recent cases. 154
Recently, FCA actions have resulted in major penalties, particularly against
the life sciences industry. In 2012, a verdict against pharmaceutical giant
14 6 Id. § 3733(a)(1).
147 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Optimizing Qui Tam Litigation and Minimizing Fraud and
Abuse: A Comment on Christopher Alexion's Open the Door, Not the Floodgates, 69 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 419, 421 (2012). Jost also notes that the total settlements and judgment
amounts received as a result of the False Claims Act between 1987 and 2008 are $21.6
billion. See id at 421 n.10.
148 Doan, supra note 27, at 60.
149Id.
150 John T. Brennan, Jr. & Michael W. Paddock, Limitations on the Use of the False
Claims Act to Enforce Quality of Care Standards, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 37, 39 (2008).
151 DOJ was criticized for its handling of a well-covered case in the late 1990s involving
a Washington, D.C. psychiatrist, George Krizek. See Thomas L. Greaney & Joan H. Krause,
United States v. Krizek: Rough Justice Under the Civil False Claims Act, in HEALTH LAW &
BIOETHICS: CASES IN CONTEXT 187-96 (Sandra H. Johnson et al. eds., 2009). Use of the
False Claims Act in the case demonstrated its shortcomings-including its bluntness to
govern a complex reimbursement system. See id. at 203-04.
152 See Catherine Arnst, 10 Ways to Cut Health-Care Costs, BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 12,
2009), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09 47/b4156034717852.htm
("'Everywhere we look, we see evidence of fraud,' says Lewis Morris, chief counsel for the
Office of the Inspector General at the U.S. Health & Human Services Dept.").
153 See Incentivising State False Claims Acts, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/clarifying-requirements-for-a-state-false-claims-
a.aspx (last visited Aug. 2, 2012).
154 See, e.g., Katie Thomas, J&J. Fined $1.2 Billion in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/business/drug-giant-is-fined-1-2-billion-in-
arkansas.html; see also Zack Buck, Rigid, Severe Penalties of FCAs On Full Display,
HEALTH REFORM WATCH (Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2012/
04/15/rigid-severe-penalties-of-fcas-on-full-display/.
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Johnson & Johnson by an Arkansas court resulted in an award amount of $1.2
billion under the Arkansas False Claims Act,155 a finding that sent shockwaves
through the health-care industry. Bolstered by the potential liability mandated
by the FCA (or state iterations of it) that faces a defendant should it try its hand
at trial, pharmaceuticals' settlement amounts continue to break stratospheric
records-from Pfizer's $2.3 billion in 2009,156 to GlaxoSmithKline's $3 billion
in 2011,157 to Abbott's $1.6 billion in 2012.158
According to Inspector General Daniel Levinson, the growingl 59 number of
health-care fraud investigations typically follows the same pattern. The
investigation begins with "analyz[ing] and evaluat[ing] Medicare claims
data."160 This includes "analyz[ing] Medicare billing data to look for billing
anomalies" and "conduct[ing] time analysis reports."'61 After amassing other
155 See Thomas, supra note 154 (noting that the fine imposed on Johnson & Johnson
"ranked among the largest on record for a state fraud case involving a drug company").
156 See Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES
Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.html ("It was the
largest health care fraud settlement and the largest criminal fine of any kind ever.").
157 Duff Wilson, Glaxo Settles Cases with U.S. for $3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011,
at BI ("The settlement would be the largest yet in a wave of federal cases against
pharmaceutical companies accused of illegal marketing, surpassing the previous record of
$2.3 billion paid by Pfizer in 2009.").
158 Peter Loftus & Brent Kendall, Abbott to Pay $1.6 Billion, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304451104577390182002017146.html
("The Justice Department said it was the second-largest payment by a drug company to settle
an investigation, after Pfizer, Inc.'s $2.3 billion settlement in 2009. It is the latest in a series
of settlements by major drug makers whose marketing practices have been investigated by
the government in recent years.").
159 Even though the growing settlement amounts and jury verdicts show no sign of
slowing in the health care context, other industries may be experiencing a fraying of the
FCA. To this end, a federal court in Virginia recently found that the penalties required by the
FCA constituted an excessive penalty under the Eighth Amendment in United States ex rel.
Bunk v. Birkart Globistics GMBH & Co., Nos. 1:02cvl 168 (AJT/TRJ), 1:07cvl 198, 2012
WL 488256, at *11 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2012). The party contracting with the government-
the agreement related to transporting goods owned by U.S. military members-had certified
that it had not engaged in any price collusion when in fact it had. See id. at *1, *3. The court
found that the companies did defraud the government, but that the government was not
financially harmed because the colluded prices were fair and reasonable. Because the
government had not been financially harmed, the court found the statutorily mandated
damages amount-$5500 per violation, multiplied by 9,136 invoices, totaling over $50
million-to be unconstitutionally excessive. See id. at *3-4, *7, * 11. Due to the FCA's strict
requirements, the court concluded that it lacked discretion to set a different statutory penalty
and did not award any damages to the relators, nor to the government. See id at *13.
Indeed, courts have not employed similar analyses to the Bunk court when the
defendants have been health care providers or pharmaceutical companies. Still, if Bunk is
any indication, more courts may begin to look more carefully at the FCA's immense
liability, including, perhaps, in the health care context.
16 0 See Anatomy ofa Fraud Bust, supra note 111, at 3.
16 1Id
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evidence-including information gained by interviewing witnesses, consulting
banking information, and contacting medical records and billing departments,
the indictments (under the criminal fraud statutes) and further investigations
typically follow.162 Once charges are brought, agents complete a number of
follow-up tasks to see if other actors are involved in the fraud, as well as
constructing safeguards to prevent others from accomplishing the same
scheme.163 Levinson underscored the importance of the advanced technology to
the investigators, mentioning that "specialized training and advanced data
analytics have changed the way [the government] investigate[s] cases."1 64
IV. PENALIZING DEFICIENT CARE
The government's reliance on the FCA as an enforcement tool against the
health-care industry has continued to increase. Until the late 1990s, health-care
fraud cases (which were spearheaded by FCA allegations) typically "involved a
claim for a service that was either (1) not provided, (2) not necessary, or (3) had
been 'upcoded' to bill for a higher level of service than was actually
provided."1 65 At that point, "the underlying quality of the service being
provided was irrelevant to the reimbursement."l 66
But in the late 1990s, this would change; U.S Attorney offices began
developing-and courts began allowing-novel ways in which the old statute
could be applied to the modern American health-care system. 167 In the recent
era, the government has boldly sought to apply the FCA to two different (and in
some ways, opposite) types of harms it has identified in the American health-
care system regarding administered clinical care. The government's focus has
turned to these two "wrongs" recently-seeking to penalize both (1) care that is
162 See id.
163 See id. at 3-4, 7.
I64Id. at 7.
165 Devin S. Schindler, Pay for Performance, Quality of Care and the Revitalization of
the False Claims Act, 19 HEALTH MATRIx 387, 396 (2009).
166 Id
167 See Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alert: Fraud and Abuse in Nursing Home
Arrangements with Hospices, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,415 (Apr. 24, 1998); Joan H. Krause, A
Conceptual Model of Health Care Enforcement, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 55, 62-63 (2003) ("In
addition to pursuing allegations of fraud against individual providers, the government
developed proactive initiatives targeting particular sectors of the health care industry for
intensive scrutiny... . By the late 1990s, nursing homes increasingly found themselves
under scrutiny for fraud based on alleged quality-of-care deficiencies." (footnote omitted));
see also Brennan & Paddock, supra note 150, at 43; Joan H. Krause, Healthcare Fraud and
Quality of Care: A Patient-Centered Approach, 37 J. HEALTH L. 161, 163-64 (2004)
("[P]rosecutors ... have sought to extend this powerful law to encompass broader categories
of improper activities" and "[r]ecent cases have sought to style regulatory noncompliance,
rather than billing misrepresentations, as actionable falsity or fraud.").
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substandard, and (2) care that is unnecessary-garnering, where solicited, a
tepid response from the judiciary.168
A well-documented example of the government's stretching of the FCA to
address undesirable practice patterns that may not be seen as conventional
fraudulent behavior is its application in so-called "quality of care" cases. 169
Based upon the argument that the government is defrauded whenever it pays for
grossly deficient health services, this new theory of liability provided the
connection between bad care and fraud. Specifically, the government has
employed two different theories-worthless service and false certification-to
extend the FCA's application to cases where providers' services were
substandard.170
One of the theories, the worthless services theory, quickly emerged as a
viable strain of FCA liability in the nursing home and long-term care facility
context.171 The theory imposes FCA liability where the care administered is so
bad that it is worthless; by reimbursing the provider, the government is
effectively paying for nothing, and as a result, it is harmed. The theory is said to
have emerged in 1996, when the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania brought a FCA lawsuit against Tucker House, an inner-city
long-term care facility, alleging "'grossly inadequate' nutritional services and
wound care services."1 72 Specifically, the government argued that a violation of
168 Judges have noted the difficulties. See, e.g., United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp.,
115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1152 (W.D. Mo. 2000) ("At the outset, the Court notes that the parties
and many of the articles and cases which the Court has read in the course of its research have
discussed the policy considerations of the Government's recent trend of utilizing the FCA as
a check on health care providers. While at certain times a court is required to consider policy
questions, it is generally the function of the courts to interpret the law as written. In this case
there may be broad negative implications for the health care industry by the continued
prosecution of providers under the FCA. But it is not the place of this Court to exempt an
entire industry from FCA liability simply because it may be hurt by such suits. If the claims
submitted by the Government comport with the requirements of claims submitted under the
FCA, then the suit is proper. If this outcome is unsavory to the Defendant or its industry as a
whole then the change is to made [sic] in the political arena via Congress or the Executive
Branch. This Court will interpret the plain meaning and logical interpretation of the FCA as
it applies to this case, and not entertain wide speculation as to the effect of any particular
decision.").
169 See Krause, supra note 8, at 1399-1406 (documenting the various types of quality-
of-care fraud).
170 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048,
1053 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting leave to amend following dismissal due to applying worthless
services theory); United States ex rel. Bailey v. Ector Co. Hosp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 759 (W.D.
Tex. 2004) (addressing and recognizing both strains of liability, but granting dismissal);
United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Ctrs., Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1485, 1487-89
(W.D. Okla. 1996) (applying false certification theory).
171 See Schindler, supra note 165, at 396-97; see also United States ex rel. Swan v.
Covenant Care Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (denying worthless
services claim but recognizing it as a viable strain of liability).172 Brennan & Paddock, supra note 150, at 43; see also Krause, supra note 8, at 1403.
2013] 487
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
the FCA occurred because the facility offered services that were clearly
inadequate.173 The lawsuit had stemmed from the emergency hospitalization of
one of its patients in which providers noticed that the patient "was suffering
from 26 ulcers, a gangrenous leg and a series of other serious complications."l 74
The parties eventually entered into a settlement agreement, and Tucker House
agreed to pay $25,000 to settle the novel FCA allegations.175 The new theory
was applied by the same office in a subsequent investigation of three more
nursing homes which resulted in settlements totaling $500,000.176
Beyond serving as a tool that precipitates settlements for DOJ, at least one
circuit court has recognized the worthless services theory as a statutorily
grounded and well-supported legal theory. Albeit while dismissing the
plaintiffs FCA complaint for other reasons without prejudice, 177 the court
noted that "knowingly billing for worthless services or recklessly doing so with
deliberate ignorance may be actionable under [the FCA]." 178 Even though other
courts have required heightened showings by plaintiffs to satisfy the worthless
services theory strain of liability,179 it remains both a tool for the government
and a threat to all health-care providers. As a result, "facilities which
consistently fail to meet whatever standard of care the [f]ederal government
currently considers appropriate, are at risk of both malpractice claims .. . and of
being charged with either civil or criminal billing fraud."' 80
The other theory of liability-false certification-can arise in similar
scenarios. False certification theory18' works to apply FCA liability to services
rendered that failed to be "medically indicated and necessary for the health" of
the Medicaid or Medicare beneficiary.182 Should the provider sign off on this
173 See Schindler, supra note 165, at 396-97.
174Id. The amount of Tucker House's settlement-compared with more recent
settlements-seems quite low.
175 Brennan & Paddock, supra note 150, at 43.
176 See Schindler, supra note 165, at 397.
177 See United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1053-54
(9th Cir. 2001).
1781d. at 1053.
179 See United States ex rel. Bailey v. Ector Co. Hosp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 759, 766 (W.D.
Tex. 2004) (holding that because "the record [did] not show the Defendants' services were
so deficient as to be worthless," the quality-of-care claim should be dismissed); United
States ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1221 (E.D. Cal. 2002)
("Because Swan does not allege that Covenant Care's neglect of its patients was so severe
that, for all practical purposes, the patients were receiving no room and board services or
routine care at all, her FCA claim does not fit within the worthless services category.").180 Schindler, supra note 165, at 400.
181 Scholars have made insightful arguments against recognition of false certification
theory-namely, when predicated on a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. See, e.g.,
John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False Claims
Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1999).
182 Health Insurance Claim Form 1500, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES
(Aug. 2005), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMS-Forms/downloads//CMS
1500805.pdf.
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type of care and submit the bill for reimbursement, he or she is subjected to
liability because it cannot be said that the care complied with all applicable
statutes and regulations-chiefly, in quality-of-care cases, because it did not
meet the standard of care.
In an early iteration of the false certification theory, the Western District of
Oklahoma allowed an FCA lawsuit to proceed where plaintiffs relied on an
implied false certification theory after the defendant facility allegedly "knew
that it was not providing to its patients appropriate quality of care and a safe and
secure environment."1 83 Specifically, the patients allegedly suffered physical
injury and sexual abuse because of "understaffed shifts, lack of monitoring
equipment, and inappropriate housing assignments."184 Rejecting the
defendant's assertion that the government failed to identify any "statute or rule
that imposes an objective standard of safety or quality of care as a billing
requirement," the court found that rules governing Medicaid "clearly require
health-care providers to meet quality of care standards," allowing the FCA
claim to proceed "against a provider of substandard health-care services under
appropriate circumstances." 18 5 Based upon this argument, and subject to what
constitutes "appropriate circumstances," the FCA would always apply to cases
of substandard care.
In another early quality-of-care case, the Western District of Missouri
refused to dismiss FCA claims based on substandard care on the basis of
implied false certification theory.186 The court noted that the "health care
provider can be held to have impliedly certified that it will comply with the
relevant standard of care as set forth in the regulations and statutes if that
standard of care lies at the core of the parties' agreement." 87 More clearly, the
dispute focused not on how the defendant provided certain health-care services,
"but whether the [d]efendant did these things at all."' 8 8 By drawing this
distinction, the court recognized a real-but limited-strain of liability based on
implied certification and refused to dismiss the government's FCA claim
against NHC Healthcare Corporation.
Still, neither the worthless services theory nor the false certification theory
is universally recognized; one circuit court has explicitly narrowed the false
certification theory,189 and another has jettisoned other court-made categories
183 United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Ctrs., 945 F. Supp. 1485, 1487
(W.D. Okla. 1996).
184I. at 1488.
185 Id
186 See United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (W.D. Mo.
2000).
187 I e
188 Id
189 See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 200 1).
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for analyzing FCA cases altogether.190 In Mikes v. Straus, a qui tam relator
brought an FCA claim against her former employer, alleging that because the
providers with whom she worked failed to calibrate spirometer machines,'91 the
test results were unreliable.192 By using the machines and then billing federal
health-care programs for reimbursement, the clinic had violated the FCA, the
relator alleged.
The Second Circuit found that certifying the "medical necessity" of the tests
(what the providers had to certify in order to get reimbursement from the
government) did not "impart a qualitative element mandating a particular
standard of medical care" and that the term "ordinarily indicates the level-not
the quality--of the service."1 93 The court's critique of the theory went deeper.
Differentiating its approach from the approach applied to false certification
cases, the Mikes court noted that its approach "to the phrase 'medically
necessary' would apply "to ex ante coverage decisions but not ex post critiques
of how providers executed a procedure." 194 The court concluded that-through
the certification-the provider only certified that the procedure was performed
and that the "procedure was medically necessary," but said nothing of the
quality of the procedure and whether or not it met the applicable standard of
care. 195 As the Second Circuit clearly indicated, the various quality-of-care
theories are not universally recognized by all courts.
Following in the footsteps of the quality-of-care cases, a new type of
liability-fraud liability based on overtreatment-has recently emerged.
However, unlike the quality-of-care theories, this theory has been shielded from
any meaningful judicial review. A review of the overtreatment enforcement
model is finally provided below.
190 See United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385 (1st
Cir. 2011) (refusing to classify case as a "certification" case and noting that the court-made
categories "obscure and distort" the FCA).
191 Spirometry-a "common office test"-is used to diagnose asthma, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and other respiratory conditions. Spirometry, MAYO
CLINIC (July 9, 2011), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/spirometry/MY00413/. It
measures the quantity of air and speed at which one can exhale during respiration. See id.
192 See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 692-93.
193 Id. at 698.
1 94 1d
195 See Schindler, supra note 165, at 403; see also Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699-700 ("[T]he
False Claims Act was not designed for use as a blunt instrument to enforce compliance with
all medical regulations-but rather only those regulations that are a precondition to
payment-and to construe the impliedly false certification theory in an expansive fashion
would improperly broaden the Act's reach. Moreover, a limited application of implied
certification in the health care field reconciles, on the one hand, the need to enforce the
Medicare statute with, on the other hand, the active role actors outside the federal
government play in assuring that appropriate standards of medical care are met. Interests of
federalism counsel that 'the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and
historically, a matter of local concern."').
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V. PENALIZING OVERTREATMENT AND THE ICD INVESTIGATION
Different from fraud investigations that seek to ensure more or better care
(as in the quality-of-care cases mentioned above), the government has recently
begun to go after overtreatment in an effort to achieve less care. 196 In these
investigations, the government claims that the defendant has committed fraud
by administering care and services that are beyond what is medically
necessary.197 Using present investigations as a guide, this type of case can be
commenced when the government notices anomalies in a particular provider's
billing, focusing on "wasteful services" for which Medicaid or Medicare has
been billed.198 DOJ flags and notifies the provider or facility, alleging that the
FCA has been violated. Afraid of the high penalties associated with the FCA,
providers and facilities acquiesce in the face of the government's allegations
and settle the charges by paying a large fine.199 DOJ hails the settlement as
protecting American patients and taxpayers from fraud. 200 Then investigators
look at more hospitals' and providers' bills, and the story repeats itself. This
new wave of liability-which relies on the threat of FCA liability to penalize
overtreatment-is perhaps best exemplified by an ongoing initiative undertaken
196 See infra notes 202-23 and accompanying text. The exemplar initiatives presented in
this piece seek to achieve the goal of reining in expense, limiting time in the hospital, or
limiting the provision of certain procedures.
197 See, e.g., Liz Kowalczyk, Hospital's Medicare Billing Examined, BOSTON.COM (Feb.
6, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2012/02/06/federal_
investigatorssubpoena six_yearsofmedicare recordsfrom beth israeldeaconess/
(describing an example of attorneys reviewing billing records to determine whether or not
the procedures were medically necessary and appropriate).
198 See id. This pattern follows the steps outlined by Mr. Levinson in his 2012 testimony
before Congress. See Anatomy ofa Fraud Bust, supra note 111.
19 9 Interestingly, during the kyphoplasty initiative, which will be used as an example of
an overtreatment investigation, the government has not pressed providers to enter into a
Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) in conjunction with settlement. See Faegre Baker
Daniels LLP, Where is the CIA?-Recent Pharmaceutical and Hospital False Claims Act
Settlements Raise the Question of Whether a Presumption Against Corporate Integrity
Agreements Exists for Certain Categories of Conduct, BEYOND HEALTHCARE REFORM (Feb.
14, 2012), http://beyondhealthcarereform.com/where-is-the-cial (opining that the
kyphoplasty settlements did not come with CIAs due to a lack of monitoring resources and
the type of conduct that occurred).
200 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fourteen Hospitals to Pay U.S. More
Than $12 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Related to Kyphoplasty (Feb. 7,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2012/February/12-civ-173.html (quoting
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division Tony West as saying, "Patients want
reassurance that their health care provider is making treatment decisions based on the
patient's best interests, not an interest in maximizing profits . . . . By recovering taxpayer
dollars lost to improper billing, this settlement will help support the vital health care
programs we depend on.").
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by DOJ: the investigation into the medical appropriateness of using implantable
cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs). 20 1
Although it has not yet reached full resolution, DOJ has undertaken a
groundbreaking nationwide "patient-by-patient" investigation of the placement
of ICDs over a seven-year period in the United States. 202 ICDs are described as
"small device[s] . . . placed in the chest or abdomen" that are used to "help treat
irregular heartbeats" by using "electrical pulses or shocks to help control life-
threatening arrhythmias." 203 These expensive devices-ICDs cost Medicare
$40,000 each204-are intended for those who are at the highest risk of sudden
cardiac arrest.205 Scientific reports published in early 2011206 concluded that a
significant percentage of patients-more than 20% of those receiving the ICDs
between 2005 and 2010-did not meet established Medicare guidelines for the
procedures. 207 As a result, the procedure caught the eye of the government
attorneys and regulators, who are concerned about the medical appropriateness
and necessity of ICDs that were implanted outside of the bounds of the
Medicare guidelines.
Specifically, DOJ appears focused on the particulars of the Medicare
National Coverage Determination (NCD)208-with the granular timing
requirements within the NCD that determine when the ICD is clearly
"medically necessary" becoming the focal point of the investigation. To this
201 See What Is an Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator?, NAT'L HEART, LUNG, &
BLOOD INST. (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/icd/
(noting that an ICD "is a small device that's placed in the chest or abdomen ... . to help
treat irregular heartbeats called arrhythmias . . .. [by using] electrical pulses or shocks to
help control life-threatening arrhythmias, especially those that can cause sudden cardiac
arrest").
202 Joe Carlson, Cardiac Arrests: Hospitals Anxious They Could Face Hefty False
Claims Penalties in Implanted Cardiac Defibrillator Cases, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jul. 23,
2012, at 6, 6, available at http://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/2012072 1/MAGAZINE
/307219994.
203 What Is An Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator?, supra note 201.
204 See Carlson, supra note 202, at 6.
205 See id
206See id.; Sana M. Al-Khatib et al., Non-Evidence-Based ICD Implantations in the
United States, 305 JAMA 43, 43-49 (2011).
207See Carlson, supra note 202; see also Sabriya Rice & Miriam Falco, Study: Many
Defibrillator Implants Went to Marginal Candidates, CNN (Jan. 5, 2011, 2:25 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/0 1/04/defibrillator.implants.study/index.html (noting
that "[m]ore than 20% of patients who received an implantable cardioverter-
defibrillator ... were not good candidates to receive the device").
208 According to CMS, National Coverage Determinations "are made through an
evidence-based process, with opportunities for public participation." Medicare Coverage
Determination Process, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/DeterminationProcess/index.html?redirect-IDeter
minationProcess. NCDs clarify which "items and services ... are reasonable and necessary
for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury," and thus eligible for coverage under
Medicare. Id.
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point, Medicare does not cover ICDs implanted within forty days of a heart
attack or ninety days of an angioplasty or bypass surgery.209 But as providers
and lawyers have noted, the guidelines are rigid,210 and do not reflect clinical
reality.211 For example, many candidates who recently had a heart attack,
angioplasty, or a bypass surgery still remain appropriate candidates for an ICD
if they have elevated risk of sudden death from cardiac arrest-and some are
patients particularly in need of the procedure. 212
Whether and to what extent the FCA will be used by DOJ in an effort to
achieve settlement for the alleged overtreatment-a "first-of-its-kind legal
strategy of enforcing .. . [an NCD]"-has not yet been determined. 213
Interestingly, "[h]ospital lawyers [who are being investigated] say the [DOJ] is
looking to enforce Medicare's coverage rules through the lens of the
[FCA] . . . which is not how reviews of medical-necessity have been
conducted."214 Still, it seems that if hospitals "billed in violation of the
[Medicare ICD] timing requirement," the government will be "seek[ing] some
sort of payment." 215
What makes the investigation particularly tricky is each patient's
individualized presentation. DOJ will likely take the position that "medical
necessity in this area is not always black and white"-and will seek creative
2 09 See Carlson, supra note 202, at 7.2 10 See, e.g., Nina Youngstrom, DOJ Appears Open to Idea that Medical Necessity,
NCD Don't Always Overlap, HEALTH Bus. DAILY (July 5, 2011),
http://aishealth.com/archive/ rmc062711-01 ("[Minneapolis attorney David] Glaser and
other experts, including physician Tom McCarter, chief clinical officer of Executive Health
Resources in Philadelphia, say that ICDs should be more open to interpretation. Sometimes
ICDs are medically necessary even if they don't fit inside the tidy box of the covered
indications. A classic example is former vice president Dick Cheney ... who has an ICD
implant [and] became fodder for the Medicare ICD coverage debate even though at the time
he was covered by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program rather than Medicare.
Despite serious, highly publicized heart problems, Cheney still would not have been a
candidate for Medicare-covered ICD surgery . ... '[Cheney] didn't actually
qualify . .. because his ejection fraction was 40%,' said physician Arthur Moss, who
represented the Guidant Corporation, a device maker. The NCD requires ejection fractions
of less than or equal to 35%. (Ejection fraction refers to how well the left side of the heart is
pumping blood.).").
211 See Carlson, supra note 202, at 7.
2 12 See id.
213 See id. Indeed, "[i]nitially, DOJ took the position that noncompliant billing for ICD
implantation is within the realm of the [FCA]." Larry Husten, Guest Post: Feds Turn Corner
in ICD Investigation; Hospital Liability Divided into Categories, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larryhusten/2012/08/07/guest-post-feds-turn-corner-in-icd-
investigation-hospital-liability-divided-into-categories/. But now "the government is
considering whether to apply the [FCA] in some instances." Carlson, supra note 202, at 16.
2 14 Carlson, supra note 202, at 6.
2 15 Husten, supra note 213.
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penalties based on each hospital's individual facts.216 However, the fact that an
ICD was implanted outside of Medicare guidance does not make the procedure
medically inappropriate. As attorney David Glaser notes, "DOJ and Medicare
auditors should be asking hospitals whether the decision to implant the ICD in
the patient is reasonable and necessary, rather than whether the implants met the
letter of the NCD."217
As part of the investigation, DOJ has reviewed ICDs performed at a number
of hospitals nationwide, including the world-renowned Cleveland Clinic. In its
review of the Cleveland Clinic, its module flagged, as potentially inappropriate,
264, or 4.4%, of all ICDs done within its doors.218 Dr. Bruce Lindsay, who
heads "the cardiac pacing and electro-physiology section for the
system ... personally examined every one of the .. . cases the Justice
Department questioned." 219 In Lindsay's opinion, all 264 patients were
appropriate recipients of an ICD, but he found twelve "in which the timing of
the implants appeared to fall outside of the rules laid down by the CMS
[Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services] for when patients can receive the
devices." 220 His review shows how clinical judgment may diverge from
bureaucratic guidelines in this instance-or at least it demonstrates that clinical
judgment may not be at consensus. What is undisputable is the fact that some
doctors placed ICDs outside of the guidelines based upon their clinical
judgment, and would do it again.221
Nevertheless, as of the fall of 2012, a "breakthrough" in the investigation
had occurred.222 Specifically, "DOJ now has a blueprint for determining
hospital liability," and the investigation will likely result in settlements in the
near future. 223 The ICD investigation provides a clear example of DOJ's new
enforcement strategy against overtreatment-where anti-fraud tools are
increasingly being applied-and serves as a vehicle for which to study the
unsettling consequences that come with such a strategy.
216Id.; see also Ara Beth Gershengom et al., United States: DOJ Takes New Tack on
Hospital Recoupments: Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators, MONDAQ (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/195336/trials+appeals+compensation/DOJ+Takes+
New+Tack+On+Hospital+Recoupments+Implantable+Cardiac+Defibrillators (noting that
guidance released in the fall of 2012 indicates that DOJ "will evaluate each hospital's
situation individually" and will apply a "damages multiplier" based upon four factors).
2 17 Youngstrom, supra note 210.
2 18 See Carlson, supra note 202, at 7.
219 Id
220 Id
221 Id222 See Husten, supra note 213; see also Gershengom et al., supra note 216
(documenting DOJ's model to individually determine provider hospital liability based on
different individualized factors).
223 Husten, supra note 213.
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VI. CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT
Presumably, the government has begun to recover funds for overtreatment
cases through fraud investigations and settlements because they offer a good
return on enforcement expenditures, provide positive publicity, and easily
achieve settlement. However, for both doctrinal and policy-based reasons, the
FCA's application to overtreatment cases-catching the providers who
performed and implanted ICDs beyond the bounds of Medicare standards, for
example-is troubling. In general, the strategy constitutes a minimal, piecemeal
approach that will never actually address the root causes of overtreatment
discussed above.
Additionally, DOJ's enforcement model in overtreatment cases presents an
expansion of FCA liability that is reliant on three interrelated and concerning
characteristics. First, data mining-characterized as the practice of scouring
hospital bills using sophisticated data review technology-is wielded by the
government as proof that fraud must have occurred, and incentivizes quick
settlement without allowing sufficient review of the particular procedure's
clinical appropriateness. Second, in overtreatment cases, the government is
willing to enforce a practice standard within areas in which the standard is
likely still developing within clinical practice-with drastic effects. As a result,
the merits of the investigation revolve around the vague, underdeveloped
definition of "medical appropriateness," and settlements freeze the practice
standard that exists at the time. Finally, the exorbitant statutory penalties that
result from the application of the FCA forces providers to settle allegations even
if the providers did not actually commit any wrongdoing. The risk to providers
of an adverse finding at trial-even if that risk is exceedingly minimal-is
simply too great for doctors and hospitals to take. Below an in-depth review of
these three factors-complete with enforcement examples-is undertaken.
A. DOJ's Data-Mining Tactics
As seen in the ICD investigation, DOJ is increasingly using data mining-
in which investigators look for clusters of billing anomalies-to regulate the
practice of medicine. In May 2012, following the "largest one-day takedown
ever by the government's Medicare fraud task force," HHS Secretary Sebelius
said the use of data review would be intensified.224 "Now, we're analyzing
patterns and trends and claims data, instead of just going claim by claim," she
224 Scott Cohn, Feds Announce Biggest-Ever Medicare Fraud, Totaling $450 Million,
NBC NEWS (May 2, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/05/02/11504338-feds-
announce-biggest-ever-medicare-fraud-totaling-450-million?lite. Interestingly, some note
that the federal government has been rather slow to implement technologies that private
insurance has used to ferret out fraud for years. Estimates vary, but it has been estimated that
"private insurers lose perhaps 1 to 1.5 percent in fraud," while "Medicare and Medicaid may
be closer to 10 to 15 percent." Matthews, supra note 6.
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said.225 Inspector General Daniel Levinson-in his testimony to Congress-
confirmed the importance of billing records, noting that "medical record
reviews" and "analysis of financial and billing data," coupled with other
intelligence, often helps agents identify conspirators engaged in a fraudulent
scheme.226
Granted, on one hand, the practice tool of data mining is a welcome
development; through it, government investigators can easily catch a fraudulent
scheme in progress. Additionally, it often provides an important inception point
for an FCA investigation-when investigators notice an anomaly in the data,
resources can justifiably be spent in further investigating those providers. The
danger, of course, comes in relying exclusively on data mining. Once the
government has the data that a hospital is an "outlier," and sends a letter of
investigation, defendants are increasingly incentivized (for reasons explored,
infra Part VI.C) to settle immediately. This transforms data mining from a
helpful tool to the primary tool used to catch providers and achieve settlement.
Allegations based solely on records data result in quick settlement, perhaps with
little inquiry into why the hospital's records were outliers in the first place.
An apt example of the power of data mining can be found in the currently
ongoing kyphoplasty investigation.227 Originally initiated by a qui tam
complaint filed in the Western District of New York,228 the lawsuit resulted in a
$75 million 229 settlement with medical device company Kyphon Inc. (Kyphon),
now a part of Medtronic Spine LLC,230 to settle allegations that the company's
225 Matthews, supra note 6.
226 Anatomy ofa Fraud Bust, supra note 111, at 4.
227 According to the Mayo Clinic, a kyphoplasty is a procedure offered to patients with
"compression fractures in the spine." Vertebroplasty, MAYO CLINIC, http://
www.mayoclinic.org/vertebroplasty/kyphoplasty.htmf (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) Further,
during the procedure:
a patient undergoing kyphoplasty lies face down. The physician advances a thin tube
into the fractured vertebra from an incision in the back. Through the tube, the physician
drills a small hole through the hard, outer part of the bone and into its softer center. This
provides a pathway for the physician to insert a special balloon into the interior of the
vertebra, which is then inflated. This pushes apart the caps, or end plates, of the
fractured vertebra, and restores the vertebra to its original shape as much as possible.
The balloon is then deflated and removed, leaving a cavity that the physician fills with
bone cement.
Id. 228 See First Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. Bates v. Kyphon, Inc., No. 05-
CV-6568 CJS(f) (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2006), 2006 WL 6272663 [hereinafter First Amended
Complaint].
229 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Medtronic Spine, Formerly Kyphon Inc., to
Pay U.S. $75 Million to Resolve Allegations of Defrauding Medicare (May 22, 2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 2008/May/08-civ-455.html.
2 30 Medtronic acquired Kyphon in 2007 for $3.9 billion. It is asserted that the fraudulent
marketing scheme increased Kyphon's profits and stock price, ultimately resulting in
Medtronic's purchase of the company. See Mary Williams Walsh, Medtronic Settles a Civil
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marketing staff had devised a seven-year scheme to encourage hospitals to
perform and bill Medicare for inpatient kyphoplasties "rather than less costly
and more clinically appropriate outpatient kyphoplasty treatment." 231 The qui
tam relators asserted that "in the vast majority of cases" one-night inpatient
hospital stays were not medically necessary for patients receiving
kyphoplasty. 232
After the settlement with Kyphon, the office of the U.S. Attorney for the
Western District of New York William J. Hochul started reviewing hospitals'
billing records, searching for data that reflected overutilization of inpatient
kyphoplasty. 233 The initiative has largely relied on data to find the targets of the
investigation, and the "kyphoplasty initiative," as it has become known, has
been highly successful for the government. 234 Investigations of individual
hospitals have followed a similar pattern: when investigators come upon
evidence of abnormally high clusters of inpatient kyphoplasties in a hospital,
they send letters to the implicated facilities, "saying that by billing for an
impatient stay following a kyphoplasty the hospital knowingly violated the
[FCA] and is liable for treble damages and penalties." 235 Accompanying the
contact is usually the government's "offer[] to compromise the hospital's
liability if it agrees to 'cooperate."' 236 Upon such cooperation, DOJ has offered
to waive the traditional treble liability under the FCA-in favor of double
damages. 237 After receiving the letters, hospitals have been undoubtedly willing
to negotiate, and the investigations have resulted in an ever-growing number of
settlements. Bolstered by waves in May 2009,238 September 2009,239 May
Lawsuit on Allegations of Medicare Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at CI. After sale to
Medtronic, Kyphon's top fifteen executives reportedly received about $145 million in
options and stock. See id.
231 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 229.
232 First Amended Complaint, supra note 228, at para. 102.2 33 See Kirk S. Davis, The Increasing Complexity of Health Care Litigation, ASPATORE,
Sept. 2011, at *7, available at 2011 WL 4453329.2 34 See Steven W. Postal & Robyn Whipple Diaz, DOJ's Kyphoplasty Initiative: AHA
Urges Greater Oversight in the Wake of Continuing Settlement Announcements, ABA
HEALTH ESOURCE (May 10, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/
aba health esource home/aba healthlaw esource_1105_postal.html (describing and
documenting the "kyphoplasty initiative").
235 Davis, supra note 233, at *7.
2361dy
2 37 See Letter from Richard J. Umbdenstock, President and C.E.O., Am. Hosp. Ass'n, to
Eric Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., and Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y, Dep't of Health and Human
Servs. (Sept. 7, 2010) [hereinafter September 7 Letter], available at www.aha.org/aha/
letter/2010/100907-let-HEAT-FCA.pdf
2 38 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Minnesota Hospitals to Pay U.S. $2.28
Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (May 21, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2009/May/09-civ-497.html.
2 39 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indiana and Alabama Hospitals to Pay U.S.
Over $8 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Sept. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-civ-1030.html.
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2010,240 January 2011,241 and February 2012,242 as of the fall of 2012, the
initiative had boasted settlements with 40 hospitals nationwide, and had netted
more than $39 million.243 Once settlements are achieved, the attorneys return to
the data to find other outliers.
Like the Cleveland Clinic in the ICD enforcement example, Greenville
Memorial Hospital in Greenville, South Carolina received a letter from DOJ as
part of the kyphoplasty initiative. In response, Greenville Memorial conducted
its own internal review, but found no evidence of any wrongdoing.244 Still, the
hospital settled for $1.1 million, because "'investigators told them they had the
power to widen their fraud probe far beyond just the spinal-compression surgery
if the hospital refused to settle the litigation."' 245 Although the appropriateness
of such a stance taken by DOJ attorneys is questionable, 246 the apparent threats
coupled with the devastating penalties mandated by the FCA are proving highly
effective in achieving settlement.247
Unsurprisingly, the industry's largest trade association, the American
Hospital Association (AHA), has repeatedly and clearly objected to both the
government's initiative and its tactics surrounding the kyphoplasty
investigation. A September 2010 letter from AHA President Richard J.
Umbdenstock to U.S. Attorney General Holder and HHS Secretary Sebelius
portrayed the "kyphoplasty initiative as the most egregious example" of what it
called "DOJ's overly-aggressive enforcement tactics."248 Noting that the FCA
was not meant to apply to "billing errors" or "non-culpable over-utilization,"249
the AHA alleged that the initial DOJ letter to hospitals "force[d] providers into
240 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nine Hospitals in Seven States to Pay U.S.
More Than $9.4 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Related to Kyphoplasty
(May 17, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/May/10-civ-578.html.
24 1 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Seven Hospitals in Six States to Pay U.S.
More Than $6.3 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Related to Kyphoplasty
(Jan. 4,2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/201 1/January/ 11-civ-006.html.242 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 200.243 See id.244 See A. Brian Albritton, Can They Do That? Government Threats to "Come Down
and Look Around" to Force Settlement in Qui Tam Cases, 24 HEALTH LAW. 16, 16 (2011).
245 Id
246 See id. at 16-17 ("While civil government attorneys have broad authority, they
cannot simply 'come down and look around' if a hospital does not give in to government
settlement demands in a civil qui tam action.... Hence, a civil government attorney may be
subject to discipline by the DOJ for violating a state's rules of professional conduct if he or
she threatens to employ government process to 'look around' in areas which are outside the
scope of the investigation and for which the attorney does not have cause to investigate.").
24 7 See Doan, supra note 27, at 60 ("Critics have characterized the U.S. government's
increased use of the FCA against the healthcare industry as a mechanism 'to bully' providers
and to 'inflict a death blow on already struggling healthcare institutions.' . . . Regardless of
one's perception, the reality is that the FCA, as employed against unsophisticated healthcare
providers, is merciless in its enforcement." (footnotes omitted)).
248 Postal and Whipple Diaz, supra note 234.
249 September 7 Letter, supra note 237.
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undertaking expensive and burdensome audits" and required their results to "be
turned over to DOJ in order to appear cooperative." 250 Further, Umbdenstock
argued that requiring an FCA settlement here was especially wasteful.251
Finally, "[w]ithout greater oversight from your offices," Umbdenstock
continued, "we are concerned that such settlements will be taken as vindication
of a theory, and of tactics."252
Echoing the AHA, health-care attorneys have recently criticized DOJ for its
tactics. Assailing the use of data mining in this way,253 those in the industry
have asserted that federal officials are scrutinizing overnight stays to determine
"whether those admissions are medically necessary or if they are simply an
unnecessary cost that enhances hospital revenue," a practice some argue is
inappropriate for bureaucrats. 254
Granted, data mining-when coupled with other investigative and
information-gathering tactics-is an efficient and important tool. But when the
investigation uses data to find outliers, and the information-gathering phase of
the investigation is short-circuited in order to achieve quicker settlements, the
time for clinical explanation for why the hospital was applying a different
standard-a key and determining factor in whether or not fraud occurred-is
arrested. The development of the practice standard in overtreatment cases is
explored more deeply below.
B. Freezing the Practice Standard
Overtreatment cases-in fact, all health-care fraud cases-serve as a quick
and (relatively) easy way for the federal government to either change or cement
the applicable practice standard, which purportedly invades a sacred province
typically reserved to physicians and other health-care providers.255 in
250 Postal and Whipple Diaz, supra note 234.
251 See September 7 Letter, supra note 237.
2 52 Id.2 53 See id.2 54 Kowalczyk, supra note 197. "The government has gotten more aggressive in this
area, but this is a medical call," a Seattle health care regulatory attorney was recently quoted
as saying. Id. He continued, "It seems to me for the [U.S.] attorney to weigh in on whether
my 80-year-old grandmother needed to be admitted to the hospital, he doesn't know
what . .. he is talking about." Id.
Others have focused on the importance of independent medical judgment. One attorney
highlighted the fact that it is important for the government to understand that the physician
has to make an informed medical judgment at the time of admission based on the expected
medical treatment and follow-up care. Just because the patient who received the procedure
improved and is ready to be discharged-and it turned out to be a short stay-does not mean
it was an inappropriate admission. See id.
255 See, e.g., Tine Hansen-Turton et al., Nurse Practitioners in Primary Care, 82 TEMP.
L. REv. 1235, 1255 (2010) (noting that only nurses have the right to articulate the clinical
standard for the nursing profession); Neil Vidmar, The American Civil Jury for Auslander
(Foreigners), 13 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 100 (2003) ("[D]octors, hospitals, and their
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overtreatment actions, by investigating and penalizing the provider's decision to
administer more care, the government takes the decision out of the hands of the
physicians and forces them to do less, not waiting for the likely change to, and
development of, the prevailing medical standard.
As a result, the national evolution of this standard-in which physicians and
other providers read medical literature and realize that certain procedures can be
performed more efficiently or safely-is curtailed. Instead, DOJ uses its
investigatory power to allege FCA violations, immediately causing all
physicians and providers to either change or cement their behavior. Not only
does the government get an opportunity to decide what the requisite standard
should be, but it also avails itself of settlement funds from providers and
hospitals in order to make up for the retroactively "incorrect" clinical decision
made by doctors.
Just like in the quality-of-care context mentioned above, by opening these
investigations and leveling these charges, the government is often taking away
clinical judgment from health-care providers. But when the government brings
allegations in overtreatment cases, it is doing something very different than the
quality-of-care cases. Here, as shown by the ICD investigation, when the
government alleges FCA violations because of overtreatment, DOJ is no longer
seeking to ensure care of a better quality. Instead, here, the government is
applying the fraud statute to cases to limit care in which the provider may not
know that the care he or she (or it) is providing is too extensive or expensive. A
successful initiative, from the government's perspective, will cause physicians
and other providers to do less-to provide less care, fewer interventions, and
fewer inpatient (instead of outpatient) procedures. This is the primary difference
between quality-of-care cases and overtreatment cases, and this serves as what
can be called "backdoor rationing." 256
Indeed, in conventional fraud cases, government enforcement results in a
change to the practice standard-and often results in limiting care-but does so
in a different way. For example, if a group of doctors repeatedly orders
unnecessary X-rays of patients' lower backs after patients present with
generalized back pain as part of a concerted scheme to increase reimbursement
payments, an anti-fraud enforcement action will undoubtedly result in fewer x-
rays by those physicians. But ferreting out a group of providers who are
offering a clearly unnecessary procedure with the requisite fraudulent intent is a
wholly different exercise. A key distinction in overtreatment cases is that the
procedure cannot be universally characterized as unnecessary without an
medical insurance companies argue that only doctors are competent to understand the
complex medical issues and to determine the appropriate standard of care.").
2561t is worthwhile to keep in mind that the cases discussed here-the types of
overtreatment cases in which the government brings FCA allegations-are cases in which
the government, and not private insurance companies, seeks to address a harm. As a result,
DOJ's enforcement strategy will likely have an undue effect on hospitals with larger
Medicare populations.
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examination of key individualized indicators-something that is truncated by
DOJ investigations because of the reliance on data mining.
In the overtreatment enforcement model, DOJ finds "culpable" providers by
searching for clusters of expensive, questionably medically necessary
procedures, and threatens to use the biggest tool in its arsenal against those
providers in an effort to change their future behavior at the risk of
oversimplifying often highly complex clinical decisions. Compounding the
effect is the fact that nearly all of the overtreatment enforcement actions feature
procedures with still-developing standards of care. 257 Without a well-
established standard, this type of enforcement is clearly at odds with allowing
medical practice itself to determine which procedures are the most expensive,
overused, and unnecessary. 258
In addition to catching providers who administer new types of care to
patients off guard, this enforcement has the effect of cutting off and freezing the
development and determination of medical appropriateness of these cutting-
edge procedures without clinical input. At this early point, a procedure's details
could vary widely among different providers, and an overtreatment enforcement
action may unfairly target a number of providers who have a strong and
verifiable clinical defense. Worse, these impacted individuals are often the
innovators; they are the providers who are pushing the applicable standard
forward.
Using the ICD investigation as an example, a provider who places an ICD
within forty days of a patient's heart attack-which would now be outside
Medicare's payment regulations-may have a verifiable clinical reason for why
that placement was medically appropriate. And, perhaps, years from now,
largely due to that clinician's ICD placements, as well as ever-developing
clinical knowledge, the recognized practice standard's outer limit for ICDs
could shift to thirty days instead of forty. But an FCA investigation and
settlement with a provider hospital would cut off this organic development of
the standard. As seen in the ICD context, for many of DOJ "hits," providers
allege they have a clinically sound explanation for the way they administered
the procedure at issue. This may reflect that the prevailing clinical standard has
changed or developed since the last time the government published Medicare
guidelines.
257For example, in the ICD investigation, there appears to be clinical debate over
whether placement of ICDs in individuals too temporally close to a major cardiac event is
appropriate or not. See Carlson, supra note 202, at 6. In the kyphoplasty initiative, the
determination of when and how many kyphoplasties should be performed on an inpatient
basis was also still being developed. See discussion infra Part VI.B.2. After all, the
kyphoplasty procedure itself was brand new-only about 1,500 were performed in 2000;
48,000 were performed in 2004. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 228, at para. 94.258 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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1. Lessons of the "Drive-Through Delivery" Battle
The peril of government-forced standard setting is poignantly made by the
highly publicized and politicized battle revolving around "drive-through"
deliveries in the mid-1990s. 259 As a result of this battle, the federal government
mandated more coverage for treatment for mothers and their newborns.
Codified by the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996
(Protection Act),260 insurance companies are now required to cover "at least
forty-eight hours of hospitalization following a normal vaginal delivery and
ninety-six hours of hospitalization following a Cesarean section." 261 Medicaid
is not subject to the same requirement under the law,262 although some states
have instituted similar requirements on their own.263 Under the law, a provider
may, "after consulting with the mother, ... discharge the mother or newborn
child earlier," but "[a] mother cannot be encouraged to accept less than the
minimum protections available to her ... and an attending provider cannot be
induced to discharge a mother or newborn earlier than 48 or 96 hours after
delivery."264
But the public's fervor in favor of passage may not have adequately taken
into account the clinical advisability of the new policy. In fact, mandating a
longer stay may only have a negligible effect-and maybe even a harmful
one-on the health of the mother and newborn. Specifically, "no study has
demonstrated any statistically significant increase in infant or maternal
mortality after a rapid postpartum discharge." 265 Instead, a report on the
Protection Act "implicitly criticize[d] the ... Act for its focus on the number of
hours of postpartum hospital care, instead of the needs of the mother and
259 The Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996 gained broad support
after highly publicized stories were covered by national media featuring newborns who died
"following rapid postpartum discharges." David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is
"Consumer-Protection" Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REV. 5, 19 (1999). And
it was fueled by a backlash against health management organizations (HMOs), by the
senators' personal stories, by passionate and supportive newspaper columns, and even by a
speech from First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton at the Democratic National Convention. See
id. at 18-24. Simply, public passion and "common sense" pushed through the legislation. Id
at 21.
26 0 See Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204,
110 Stat. 2935.
261 Hyman, supra note 259, at 29.262 See id. at 30 ("[T]he Newborns' Act excludes Medicaid recipients from its
protections.").
263 See AHCCCS Benefit Changes: Frequently Asked Questions, ARIZ. HEALTH CARE
COST CONTAINMENT SYS. (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.azahcccs.gov/reporting/Downloads/
Legislation/201 1/BenefitChangesFAQs.pdf.
264Fact Sheet: Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act, U.S. DEP'T LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/newboms.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2012).265 Hyman, supra note 259, at 45.
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newborn and ... the content and quality of the care they receive[d]." 266
According to Professor David Hyman, "there is little or no evidence on the
benefit side of the ledger for postpartum stays of the specified length," 267 while
the Protection Act's mandated longer coverage-if taken advantage of by
postpartum mothers-could cost as "high as $8 billion per year." 268
Although the Protection Act was celebrated at passage, 269 its effects may
actually be harmful to patients. The support for allowing longer stays in the
hospital is particularly striking, given the realization of the dangers unnecessary
stays in hospitals pose to patients. Most notably, hospital-acquired infections
cause about 100,000 deaths a year, and the numbers for "post-operative
bloodstream infections and catheter-associated urinary tract infections" are
rising.270 Although the ACA will penalize hospitals with the highest rates of
infection starting in 2015, a recent government report called hospital-acquired
infections a problem that "merited 'urgent attention. "'271 In addition to
infections, the Institute of Medicine in its famous 1999 report, To Err Is
Human, estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 die each year "as a result of
medical errors that could have been prevented"-causing more deaths than
"motor-vehicle wrecks, breast cancer, and AIDS." 272 In short, hospitals are
frequently not the safest places for relatively healthy individuals to be.
Placing aside the politicized nature of the debate, perhaps Congress should
have waited to evaluate the clinical advisability of lengthening hospital stays for
mothers and newborns, because it may be likely that clinical judgment in this
area was still developing. Instead, because of the hard-law solution, presumably
outdated clinical judgment is now codified. The same phenomenon results from
overtreatment enforcement strategies that seek to punish the outlier providers
for procedures whose standards have not yet fully developed.
266 Id. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
267Id. at 67.
268Id. at 69. Using his own estimate, Professor Hyman argues that the additional
hospital stays "have a social cost somewhere between $900 million and $1.8 billion every
year." Id. at 77.
269 See, e.g., Debra E. Kuper, Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act: Putting
the Brakes on Drive-Through Deliveries, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 667, 689 (1997) ("[T]he
adoption of the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996 is an excellent first
step in this still-developing area. New mothers can breathe a sigh of relief now that Congress
has properly placed the focus of childbirth, not on an insurance company's bottom line, but
on the health and safety of the mother and child.").
2 70 See Kevin Sack, Hospital Infection Problem Is Persistent, Study Reports, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 14, 2010, at A17 (documenting a study reported by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality).
271Id
272 1NST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (1999),
available at http://www.iom.edu/-/media/Files/Report/20Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/
To%20Err/o20is%20Human%201999%20%20report/o20brief.pdf. Notably, the errors were
estimated to cost hospitals "between $17 billion and $29 billion per year." Id.
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2. Kyphoplasty and Medical-Necessity Ambiguity
Another example of DOJ's overtreatment enforcement strategy that seeks to
solidify a standard in flux can be found in the kyphoplasty initiative-some
have worried that DOJ is working to "turn medical-necessity ambiguity into a
false claims case." 273 Beyond prompting additional compliance measures, the
government's kyphoplasty initiative has been particularly stinging to hospitals,
because, according to them, no fraud occurred. Specifically, hospitals argue that
they were completely justified in performing inpatient kyphoplasties because
frequent federal government guidance at the time reflected that inpatient
kyphoplasties were actually medically appropriate.274
To bolster their argument, the affected hospitals cite to (1) InterQual's 275
recommendation of inpatient admission for kyphoplasty between 2005 and
2008,276 (2) CMS's statement in 2008 that it was considering kyphoplasty for
an NCD and that "typically, vertebroplasties are performed in an outpatient
setting, while kyphoplasty typically requires hospital admission,"277 (3) the
AHA's Coding Clinic's 2004 statement that "kyphoplasty is typically
performed in an inpatient setting,"278 and (4) Medicare auditors' repeated
approval of inpatient kyphoplasties as medically necessary as clear indicators
that hospitals that performed inpatient kyphoplasties were not committing
fraud.279 The fact that InterQual, a source that has "received implicit
government endorsement," 280  recommended that hospitals conduct
kyphoplasties on an inpatient basis is especially informative. DOJ and OIG
have relied on InterQual's admissions and medical necessity decisions in the
past and have required that facilities use InterQual's expertise through
Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs). 281 The numerous settlements have
resolved allegations that the providers fraudulently overtreated kyphoplasty
273 Feds Widen Investigation of Inpatient Spine Surgery; Site of Service Is Under
Dispute, 18 REP. ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, no. 23, June 29, 2009, at 1, 7 [hereinafter
KYPHOPLASTY REPORT ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE].
2 74 See id.
2 75 InterQual is a product line owned by McKesson Health Solutions. See The Gold
Standard in Evidence-Based Clinical Decision Support, MCKEssON, http://www.
mckesson.com/en us/McKesson.com/Our/o2BBusinesses/McKesson%2BHealth%2BSoluti
ons/Solution%2BAreas/InterQual%2BDecision%2BSupport/InterQual%2BDecision%2BSu
pport.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). McKesson calls InterQual "the undisputed gold
standard in evidence-based clinical decision support." Id. Founded more than thirty years
ago, the guidance "can be applied in a range of clinical situations." Id.
276 See KYPHOPLASTY REPORT ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, supra note 273, at 7.
277 Id
278d
279 See id.
280 d
281 See id.
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patients between 2000 and 2008282-presumably during a time when the
kyphoplasty clinical standard was developing, given the conflicting guidance
that was published into the middle of the decade.
Still, Robert Trusiak, the chief of the affirmative civil enforcement unit in
U.S. Attorney Hochul's office, 283 denies that InterQual has any government
endorsement, indicating that "[i]t may be considered for its evidentiary value,
but will take a back seat to documentation indicating that a hospital's site-of
service decisions 'were made for financial reasons."' 284 Further, he notes that
CMS' NCD notice was not a determination that kyphoplasties should be
performed on an inpatient basis; in fact, he notes, "[k]yphoplasty does not
appear on Medicare's inpatient-only list."285 Mr. Trusiak also responded that
the government will consider the fact that Medicare auditors approved
kyphoplasty claims or lost denials on appeal "before deciding [FCA] liability,"
but again, the driving force in the investigation is whether admissions were
reasonable and necessary and patients required the intensity of service "beyond
the temporal limits of observation as reflected in the medical record."286
Nevertheless, the public will never know if the hospitals truly believed
whether their clinical explanations were defensible because of the third factor
that distinguishes and impacts overtreatment enforcement: the fact that these
cases result in rapid settlements that are not subject to the judicial scrutiny that
comes with a trial.
C. The Consequences of "Settlement-Made Law"
None of these overtreatment investigations ever turn into overtreatment
trials due to the crushing liability of the FCA,287 with major implications for the
282 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 240 ("The settlements
resolve allegations that the hospitals overcharged Medicare between 2000 and 2008 when
performing kyphoplasty .... .").28 3 See KYPHOPLASTY REPORT ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, supra note 273, at 1.284 Id. at 7.
28 51d.
28 7 See Joan H. Krause, Skilling and the Pursuit of Healthcare Fraud, 66 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 363, 388 (2012) ("As we have seen in other health care fraud contexts, most notably in
cases brought under the FCA, the availability of severe penalties significantly increases the
odds that defendants will settle rather than take their chances at trial."); Joan H. Krause,
Twenty-Five Years of Health Law Through the Lens of the False Claims Act, 19 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 13, 15 (2010) ("Faced with potential exposure in the tens or hundreds of millions
of dollars, it is no wonder that most defendants choose to settle FCA allegations rather than
testing their luck at trial."); Krause, supra note 8, at 1368 ("[C]ritics now argue that the
Act's enormous penalties give health care providers virtually no choice but to settle cases
that could not be proven in court, such as allegations based on good faith interpretations of
ambiguous health care regulations."); John B. Reiss et al., Your Business in Court 2007-08,
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legitimacy of DOJ's overtreatment enforcement strategy. As Chief Medical
Officer of Rex Healthcare, 2 88 Dr. Linda Butler-one of the provider entities
swept up in the kyphoplasty initiative-said:
We don't feel like we did anything wrong. We were following rules at the time
but it was probably easier and cheaper to settle than to fight the government
on this. We were performing this procedure on elderly frail patients in their 70s
and 80s who were in excruciating back pain and they had a lot of problems like
cancer and cardiac issues. Some even spent the night in the ICU due to their
frail state. During that time we were following the InterQual third-party billing
recommendations to bill this as an inpatient procedure. In 2007 when it was
deemed to be an outpatient procedure we began billing it as outpatient. When
the government decided to retroactively penalize people who had billed it as
inpatient before 2007 we were caught with that. We didn't think we did
anything wrong. We think it is unfair, but it was probably better to settle.2 89
Given the FCA's blunt penalties, providers--especially smaller
providers290-simply cannot risk legal exposure to the FCA at trial. Not only
are the providers subject to liability and fines under the FCA, but should they be
found liable, they are subject to exclusion from participation in the federal
health-care programs 29 1-often called the "death penalty" or "death sentence"
63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 753, 759 (2008) ("As usual, there are few cases that go to trial when
allegations involve the federal FCA because of the draconian penalties that can result.").
288 Rex Healthcare has multiple wellness center and clinic locations-and one major
hospital-in the Research Triangle area in central North Carolina. See Rex Healthcare
Locations, REX UNC HEALTH CARE, http://www.rexhealth.com/body.cfn?id=866&iirf
redirect-1 (last visited July 23, 2012).
289 John Commins, Rex Healthcare to Pay $1.9M to Settle Fraud Claims,
HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-1I/HEP-
264523/Rex-Healthcare-to-Pay- 19M-to-Settle-Fraud-Claims (emphasis added).
290 This risk is particularly potent for smaller providers, as Richard Doan argues:
Unlike large hospitals, community clinics (and comparable medical providers) do not
have the hundreds of thousands, or millions of dollars, needed to adequately defend
against FCA suits. They would be forced to quickly capitulate and settle, despite the
absence of any meaningful evidence. The alternative, unfortunately, is to face the even
stiffer penalties from a negative FCA judgment.
Doan, supra note 27, at 63 (footnote omitted).2 91 See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE: PREVENTION,
DETECTION, AND REPORTING 5 (2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-
Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Fraudand Abuse
.pdf ("The Inspector General has the authority to exclude individuals and entities who have
engaged in fraud or abuse from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and other Federal
health care programs, and .. . maintains a list of excluded parties . . . ."). According to CMS,
"[e]xclusion means that, for a designated period, Medicare, Medicaid, and other Federal
health care programs will not pay the provider for services performed or for services ordered
by the excluded party." Id. at 4.
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in the industry.292 As a result, many hospitals and doctors who first receive
notice that an investigation has been opened against them have a high
willingness to settle. The utility that comes with having a trial-testing theories,
examining evidence and intent, and most importantly, learning where the lines
are in the gray areas of the law-never occurs. Further, as Professor Krause
argues, this gives prosecutors an "unchecked" ability to write the law. 293
That these cases never reach trial precipitates additional specific
consequences in the overtreatment context. Because no defendants are willing
to fight the allegations to trial, which would entail business-ending risks, the
government is never put to its proofs-in showing fraudulent intent, combatting
any provider defenses, or, indeed, any part of the new theory of liability DOJ is
espousing. The result, according to Professor Krause, is "an unofficial body of
law comprised of legally untested theories of falsity and fraud."294
First, as Professor Krause has argued when examining FCA enforcement
generally, providers and hospitals are never given an opportunity to argue that
they did not have the requisite fraudulent scienter 295-and judges never make
findings regarding the provider's intent.296 This has been a concern shared by
commentators in the field,297 but applying the FCA in overtreatment cases
compounds its effect because of the underlying vagueness of the medical
appropriateness standard. Hospitals may be blindsided by the government's
inquiry-uncomfortably falling under the government's suspicion and
investigative focus-and then quickly want to settle the allegations while never
truly believing any violation occurred.
Adversely, in conventional FCA cases, fraudulent intent is comparatively
easy to demonstrate. This is particularly true in examples in which the provider
either "upcodes" the medical bill before submitting it for reimbursement, or in
cases in which the provider does not administer the procedure for which he
bills. In those scenarios, the individual knows that the procedure for which he or
29 2 See Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the Department of
Justice to Rein in Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76
U. CN. L. REv. 1233, 1252 (2008) ("Exclusion or debarment can be the equivalent of the
death penalty in the health care industry, where much of a provider's business typically is
dependent on Medicare reimbursement."); Alex T. Paradiso, Note, Prosecutorial Regulation
of Off-Label Promotion: Sidestepping the Courts and Congress to Levy a Tax on Suspect
"Big Pharma" Marketing, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 161, 164 (2009) (calling exclusion from
Medicare a "'corporate death sentence' for drug makers").
293 Krause, supra note 8, at 1413 ("Without judicial scrutiny, there is a risk that
prosecutors' lawmaking activities will proceed unchecked.").
294 Krause, supra note 32, at 206.29 5 See supra note 140 (discussion of requisite intent under the FCA).29 6 See Krause, supra note 32, at 204 ("While issues of falsity, intent, and preemption
receive careful (if not always consistent) treatment by the courts, no such review occurs in a
settlement.").
29 7 See, e.g., Doan, supra note 27, at 74 (expressing concern that the Medicare and
Medicaid regulations are so "voluminous" that "reckless disregard" under the FCA is easy to
demonstrate).
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she seeks reimbursement did not take place and a fraudulent intent is easily
established. Assuming negligent or honest mistakes are excluded, by simply
completing the act the provider has the requisite fraudulent intent.
The same is true within the quality-of-care context where the government
opens an investigation against a provider where the provider has to know that he
or she is providing substandard care-or the care is so substandard that, by
definition, the provider must demonstrate at least "an aggravated form of gross
negligence." 298 In quality-of-care cases, it is difficult to imagine a scenario
where a provider could be unaware that the patient has been given such
inadequate care; the care is so substandard that the health-care professional
must know it is occurring. As a result, the provider must also be aware that bills
he submits to the government reflect obviously substandard care. But neither is
the case in the overtreatment context.
Second, because few trials exist, no provider avails him- or herself of any
defense. Adding to the problem is the fact that DOJ intercedes after-
sometimes years after299-the services at issue have been rendered and paid for.
In practice, once the government attorneys find the data anomaly, make the
determination that some aspect of the care administered was unnecessary, and
open an investigation, the allegations, by their very nature, are serious enough
to push the provider toward settlement. Different from conventional scenarios in
which the FCA investigatory letter begins the investigation that eventually may
result in a trial, here the case is sufficiently packaged when the first notice of
investigation arrives.
Third, beyond not reviewing just the intent of the provider, a court does not
have an opportunity to review any part of DOJ's newest theory of liability
under the FCA, which, ultimately, stunts development of the FCA itself.300
Specifically, aggressive new tactics are never reviewed, nor are DOJ's
substantive allegations. For example, in quality-of-care cases that arose
throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, jurists-and in particular, the Second
Circuit-were careful to cabin the ability of the federal government to penalize
health-care providers and entities under the FCA.301 To do so, the Second
298 United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 945 n.12 (10th Cir. 2008);
see also supra note 140.
299As seen in the kyphoplasty initiative, DOJ is alleging that health care fraud took
place between 2000 and 2008-and has settled cases in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. See
supra notes 238-43.
300 See Krause, supra note 32, at 205-06 ("To the extent that settlement removes many
factual and legal issues from judicial scrutiny, it precludes a provider from arguing a range
of issues that are crucial both to the development of FCA jurisprudence and to the
underlying regulatory policy. As one commentator argues, 'many aspects of the law are
never litigated and never face the winnowing effects of judicial scrutiny.' . . . So viewed,
frequent settlements may be improper not only for their coercive effects on the industry, but
also because they stifles [sic] the development of the law." (footnotes omitted)).
30 1See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Since the Act is
restitutionary and aimed at retrieving ill-begotten funds, it would be anomalous to find
liability when the alleged noncompliance would not have influenced the government's
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Circuit limited the reach of the FCA by allowing enforcement of cases in which
the advisability of a whole procedure was in question, and dismissed a
prominent case in which a characteristic of the procedure was arguably
substandard, as it did in Mikes v. Straus.302 The court noted that it was
especially careful to avoid turning medical regulations into predicates of fraud
actions. 303
In Mikes, as aforementioned, pulmonologist Patricia Mikes brought a qui
tam suit against her employer, Pulmonary and Critical Care Associates.304 She
argued that her bosses failed to appropriately calibrate the spirometer in their
office, making the yielded test results incorrect. 305 In a seemingly innovative
argument, she alleged that because the testing machinery was not properly
calibrated and the test results were incorrect, the medical office submitted
claims to Medicare for false claims under the FCA when it billed for
administering the test.306 The court rejected her claims that the defendants
engaged in false certification and that the tests were not medically necessary.307
Upholding the district court's dismissal, 308 the Second Circuit was particularly
concerned with preserving the appropriate bounds of the FCA, noting that
"courts are not the best forum to resolve medical issues concerning levels of
care." 309 To do differently would "promote federalization of medical
malpractice," Judge Cardamone wrote. 310 Instead of courts determining
appropriate standards of care, the court noted that "[s]tate, local or private
medical agencies, boards and societies are better suited to monitor quality of
care issues." 311
But the government's overtreatment investigations ignore the limitation
imposed by the Second Circuit in Mikes. Instead, in overtreatment cases, the
government is unlimited in penalizing specific characteristics of the treatment.
Seemingly beyond what the Mikes court would allow, in overtreatment
investigations, the government does not focus on whether a health-care
procedure or test is wasteful per se, but may instead look to wasteful
characteristics of that test or procedure. As illustrated by the kyphoplasty
initiative, the government investigates the inpatient status of the kyphoplasty,
not whether the entire kyphoplasty procedure should have occurred in the first
decision to pay. Accordingly, while the Act is 'intended to reach all types of fraud, without
qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government,' it does not encompass
those instances of regulatory noncompliance that are irrelevant to the government's
disbursement decisions." (citation omitted)).302 See id. at 687-88.
303 See id at 699-700.
304I. at 692.30 5Id at 693.
30 6 See id.
30 7 See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 693.
30 8 See id. at 706.
30 9 Id. at 700.
310 Id
311 Id.
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place. Similarly, in the ICD investigations, the question is whether the timing of
the placement of the ICD was appropriate-again, a component or
characteristic of the procedure. In Mikes, at issue was not whether the
spirometry tests should have been administered; instead, the discussion
revolved around whether the machine was calibrated to output correct results.312
This distinction was dispositive for Ms. Mikes' case, but is the central point of
investigation in both the kyphoplasty and ICD investigations. 313
Finally, future providers are shortchanged by overtreatment enforcement
because the guidance they receive-and the frozen clinical standard to which
they are subjected-results not from clinical decision-makers nor court-made
precedent, but individual settlements. More investigations open,314 more
defendants settle, Congress and the President hail the work of the tireless
taxpayer defenders, and the process restarts-all the while leaving legal
commentators, compliance officers, and providers largely unclear on what
behavior must be avoided in order to protect against the sharp penalties of the
FCA. At bottom, as Professor Krause has argued, this may have damaging
results on the relationship between providers and the federal health-care
programs, especially during a time of change, when a lack of cooperation seems
especially injurious. 315 Indeed, as she notes, "[w]ithout a limiting principle to
restrain overuse of the FCA .. . there is a danger that the health care provider
community will come to believe that the law is being applied in an unfair and
inconsistent manner," which would "likely lead to further industry
noncompliance, necessitating the use of even more coercive enforcement
mechanisms." 316
D. The Cumulative Effect
An over-reliance on data mining, an effort to enforce and cement dynamic
standards of care based on medical appropriateness distanced from clinical
3 12 See id. at 699 ("This statutory design supports the conclusion that the medical
necessity for a procedure and its quality are distinct considerations. Inasmuch as Mikes
challenges only the quality of defendants' spirometry tests and not the decisions to order this
procedure for patients, she fails to support her contention that the tests were not medically
necessary.").
313 In the ICD investigation, the key consideration appears to be the timing of the
procedure. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text. The kyphoplasty investigation is
focused exclusively on whether the procedure should have been done on an inpatient or
outpatient basis, not whether the procedure should have ever been done. See supra notes
233-35 and accompanying text.
3 14 See Yeung, supra note 5. In 2011, the number of new federal health care fraud
prosecutions skyrocketed 68.9 % from 2010, which had previously set a record for the most
new cases in a year. See Syracuse Univ., Record Number of Federal Criminal Health Care
Fraud Prosecutions Filed in FY 2011, TRAC REPs. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://
trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/270/.
3 15 See Krause, supra note 32, at 127-28.3 16 Id
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practice, and highly damaging FCA penalties result in harmful consequences to
America's quality of care. By going after overtreatment through the FCA, DOJ
sacrifices a holistic approach that would instead target the root causes of
overtreatment. Although on their own the factors produce effects that seem
unfair and unclear to individual providers, the most damning effect of the
overtreatment enforcement model could be that it stifles innovation among
providers-actors that patients expect to be aggressive and creative problem
solvers.
Of course, using the example of the ICD investigation, DOJ may catch
some individuals who knowingly and wrongly placed ICDs in patients who
were not the appropriate candidates. Studies that focused DOJ attention on the
procedures in the first place reached this conclusion.317 Similarly, in the
kyphoplasty initiative, there may be settling hospitals that were influenced by
Kyphon's marketing teams and performed more inpatient kyphoplasties as a
result.318 Providers who engage in non-clinically supportable treatment will
have their behavior altered.
But there are other providers who may get caught in the overtreatment
enforcement model. Above all, the group of providers who innocently
administer what the government alleges is overtreatment is made up of
individuals who either: (1) practice in an inefficient or outdated way, or (2)
practice in an innovative, clinically advanced manner who are ahead of the
developing medical standards. Neither set of providers should be subject to the
FCA-a statute intended for actors who defraud the government.
The first set, those who practice in an inefficient or outdated way, need
increased information and training in order to gain exposure to more advanced
and efficient techniques. Perhaps they just need an impetus to update their
outdated techniques-like the challenge from Dr. Brody, which has spurred
clinical changes in numerous specialties. 319 For this group, application of the
FCA would seem illegitimate and particularly draconian; sure, the government
may achieve its goal of updating the physician's technique, but the physician
did not knowingly submit a false claim to the government. Indeed, there are
ways to change behavior that do not involve DOJ's investigatory powers.
The second set of individuals-those who practice in an innovative or
clinically advanced manner-are also caught by DOJ's overtreatment
enforcement model. This phenomenon is best exemplified by the ICD
investigation. Assuming there are clinically defensible and medically
appropriate ICD placements that do occur outside of the bounds of the Medicare
regulations, the providers who place the ICDs outside of the guidelines
comparatively constitute a more risk-averse and more clinically innovative
group than the providers who do not place ICDs outside of the guidelines.320
3 17 See Carlson, supra note 202; Rice & Falco, supra note 207.3 18 See supra notes 227-47 and accompanying text.
3 19 See Brody, supra note 20, at 284.
320 See fig.1.
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These may be the practitioners at the Cleveland Clinic; this is the group of
individuals who actually push the clinical standard forward. DOJ overtreatment
investigations stifle this development. Perhaps-as may be the case in the ICD
context-the bureaucratic standard has not caught up to the quickly developing
standard in the field.
Instead of impacting individuals who may be engaged in defrauding the
government by intentionally practicing overtreatment, the DOJ overtreatment
enforcement model has the possibility of sweeping up these other providers as
well.
Figure 1: The Impacts of Overtreatment Investigations
PROVIDERS INCREASINGLY COMFORTABLE
WITH RISK OF ADVERSE CARDIAC EVENT
More Averse to Risk More Comfortable with
Risk
Providers placing ICDs
outside of the Medicare
guidelines May be caught in
overtreatment investigation
Caught in overtreatment
4 4~ investigation
Not likely to place an ICD in
v ia patient outside of the
May be caught in Medicare guidelinesovertreatment investigation
Not caught in
overtreatment investigation
Going beyond taking development of the clinical practice standards out of
the hands of providers, these investigations create the real possibility of freezing
the most innovative of providers and cementing a medical appropriateness
standard that does not adequately reflect clinical realities.
Granted, there may be a claim to be made that physicians either should not
place ICDs within forty days of a heart attack, or if they do, they should not bill
for them-as the practice is in contravention of Medicare's NCD guidance. The
same concern could be raised in the kyphoplasty initiative: physicians should
not be admitting patients after the procedure, perhaps citing the risk of medical
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error one faces while in the hospital.321 And perhaps some of those arguments,
in certain circumstances, are defensible.
But perhaps the enforcement answer should be a fact-specific, well-
targeted, and clinically influenced regulation, not a 150-year-old statute. Usage
of the FCA-an initially military-minded anti-fraud statute that now carries
"death penalties" with it for health-care providers-that results in either (1)
preventing innovative physicians from offering procedures for certain patients
they believe best, or (2) forcing providers-who, after consulting clinical
judgment, conclude the procedure is appropriate-to not seek reimbursement as
to avoid any potential governmental investigation, adversely impacts health-
care quality. Instead of treating overtreatment as a challenging but separate
problem from conventional health-care fraud, the federal government has
sought to link the two-with damaging consequences for the quality of
American health care.
VII. CONCLUSION
As America continues to pay a comparatively astronomical cost for health
care for its citizens, the law must play an important and coherent role in cutting
costs, ensuring quality, and shaping behavior. An aggressive U.S. Attorney's
office, catastrophic statutory penalties, and cutting-edge technologies and
procedures create formidable challenges in the regulation and penalization of
health-care overtreatment.
Even though DOJ has applied the powerful FCA to overtreatment cases
without missing a beat, the consequences of such an enforcement model must
be examined in a critical way. Seeking to curtail spiraling health-care costs is an
endeavor that cannot be avoided sooner or later, but by applying the most
powerful anti-fraud statute to overtreatment cases, DOJ is providing nothing but
a piecemeal, person-by-person strategy without addressing any of the root
causes of America's overtreatment problem.
In addition to focusing on small and specific areas of overtreatment, DOJ's
actions smack of an illegitimate enforcement model-one in which the odds are
unfairly stacked against providers. The overtreatment initiatives often impact
and penalize the wrong providers, freeze clinical standards without judicial or
clinical input, and ultimately stifle innovation and development of our
understanding of medical appropriateness. Indeed, this marks a new and
confusing era in health-care fraud enforcement-one in which enforcement
initiatives multiply, all seeking to target the providers who merely care too
much.
321 See INST. OF MED., supra note 272, at 1.
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